



POVERTY MEASUREMENT

A Conceptual Framework

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Part I : Poverty, An Equity Issue

Basic Considerations

The concept of poverty takes its origin in social ethics, which can be seen as a central part of political philosophy, itself that domain of philosophical thinking looking for a theory of social arrangement. If we want to see a link with more familiar subjects of economic theory, we can say that this area of philosophical research belongs to the foundations of the theory of social choice. Social ethics is also deeply rooted in the more global subject of moral philosophy.

Why should we consider that the concept of poverty is primarily an ethical concept? Essentially, to think about poverty means to identify individual situations which are judged unacceptable, that means unfair, unjust, in a given society. Thus the concept of poverty arises basically from normative considerations, in regards to equity. Within the corpus of political philosophy, the theory of justice is the most appropriate domain on which to rely for the development of the concept of poverty. The most influential modern theorist in this domain of political philosophy is certainly John Rawls¹, whom Amartya Sen mentions as an important reference for his own work on the theory of equity².

The search for a fair society is in fact a search for some form of equity among the members of this society, an equitable position being defined by the equality of all members relatively to « things » which need to be specified. Poverty, which corresponds to an unacceptable degree of inequality, cannot be analysed without referring to our conception of the desired equality in the framework of the social arrangement³. In view of developing a concept of poverty, it is first required to position ourselves in regard to social equality. We choose here to take as an important basis of our reflection on the equity issue the analytic framework developed by Amartya Sen, without necessarily referring to neither adopting his personal choices relatively to social justice and poverty definitions.

The central question in the definition of social justice is «equality of what? ». That's the space question. Here, a great diversity is obviously possible in the objects (variables) taken in this space of equality. This diversity can be reduced by considering the nature of the space of equality, whether it is a space of achievements (e.g. calories and nutrients provided by daily food consumption), a space of freedoms to achieve (e.g. capacity to decide how many calories and nutrients will be obtained through daily food consumption), or a space of resources determining a set of freedoms to achieve (e.g. disposable income, monetary or in-kind, giving the capacity to decide how many calories and nutrients will be obtained through daily food consumption)⁴. The specification of the space of equality, including its nature (resources, freedoms or achievements), expresses a philosophical view on social justice, and on this basis, schools of thought can be distinguished. That will be done in the next sections.

¹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1971.

² Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, Harvard University Press, 1992, 4th printing 1997, p. XI.

³ A. Sen, loc. cit., p. 9 : « The theory of inequality evaluation has close links with that of assessment of poverty, and the choice of space becomes a central concern in identifying the poor and in aggregating the information about the states of those identified ».

⁴ It should be clear that this classification is not absolute, but relative to how the proponent of a space of equality qualifies himself this space. Thus, e.g., income could be presented as an achievement per se, the freedom to choose his income level being determined, among other resources, by the human capital. But income is usually viewed as a variable in the resource space, and for any other variable, there is usually a first natural classification as resource, freedom or achievement.

But at the very beginning, the idea of equality has to face an important difficulty: the basic heterogeneity of human beings:

We differ from each other not only in external characteristics (e.g. in inherited fortunes, in the natural and social environment in which we live), but also in our personal characteristics (e.g. age, sex, proneness to illness, physical and mental abilities). The assessment of the claims of equality has to come to terms with the existence of pervasive human diversity⁵.

This structural diversity has a strong effect on the meaning and consequences of equality in a given space. With a same level of freedom, different persons won't necessarily realize the same achievements. In well-off households, it can happen, due to cultural factors, that some or even all household members suffer from malnutrition. People having the same resources have not necessarily an equal freedom to the same achievements: due to metabolic differences, same aliments are not transformed in equal amounts of nutrients, so that an equal income does not insure access to the same quality of nutrition for different persons. To sum up:

One of the consequences of «human diversity» is that equality in one space tends to go, in fact, with inequality in another⁶.

A Traditional School: Utilitarianism as the Best Known Form of Welfarism

Welfarism in general and utilitarianism in particular see value, ultimately, only in individual utility, which is defined in terms of some mental characteristic, such as pleasure, happiness, or desire⁷.

This characterization of welfarist theories seems largely shared in the economic community:

[The welfarist approach] *aims to base comparisons of well-being, and public policy decisions, solely on individual 'utilities'.*

...
The essence of the approach is the concept of a preference ordering over goods, generally taken to be representable by a 'utility function', the value of which is deemed to be a sufficient statistic for assessing a person's well-being⁸.

Sen cannot restraint to comment on the welfarist view of well-being:

In so far as utility is meant to stand for individual well-being, it provides a rather limited accounting of that...⁹

To go farther in the characterization of welfarism and of its dominant form, utilitarianism, Sen takes the viewpoint of the informational basis:

⁵ Amartya Sen, loc. cit., p.1.

⁶ Loc. cit., p. 20.

⁷ Loc. cit., p. 6.

⁸ Martin Ravallion, *Poverty comparisons*, The World Bank, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 4-5.

⁹ Amartya Sen, loc. cit., p. 6.

*Most theories of justice can also be usefully analysed in terms of the information used in two different -though interrelated- parts of the exercise, viz. (1) the selection of **relevant personal features** and (2) the choice of **combining characteristics**. To illustrate, for the standard utilitarian theory, the only intrinsically important 'relevant personal features' are **individual utilities**, and the only usable 'combining characteristic' is **summation**, yielding the **total** of those utilities. The set of **welfarist** theories, of which utilitarianism is a particular example, retains the former part (viz. takes utilities as the only relevant features) but can use other combining characteristics, e.g. utility-based maximin (or lexicographic maximin), summation of concave transforms of utilities (such as summing the logarithms of utilities)¹⁰.*

This specific social theory has a long history:

During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism. One reason for this is that it has been espoused by a long line of brilliant writers who have built up a body of thought truly impressive in its scope and refinement. We sometimes forget that the great utilitarians, Hume and Adam Smith, Bentham and Mill, were social theorists and economists of the first rank; and the moral doctrine they worked out was framed to meet the needs of their wider interests and to fit into a comprehensive scheme¹¹.

We can see that utilitarianism, viewed as a theory of social arrangement, is not primarily and explicitly a theory of equality. But from its beginning, especially with Adam Smith's conception of the invisible hand, it was understood that the best social achievement could be reached as a result of everybody pursuing his own utility. By giving a larger opportunity to everyone to maximize his personal utility, an aggregate social utility, resulting from a combination of all the individual utilities, could be increased. In this idea lies the double root of maximization, as a characteristic of welfarist theories, and of some form or another of equality as a by-product of this maximization process, perceived as a social objective. Welfarist theories are then naturally «growth» theories.

To be more specific about the space in which equality emerges as a by-product of welfare (social utility) maximization, we have to consider how, since Adam Smith, economic theory, as a more and more autonomous field within moral philosophy, formalized progressively the welfarist approach.

In his pioneering contribution to measuring inequality in terms of social-welfare loss, Hugh Dalton (1920) used a simple utilitarian social-welfare function. Social welfare was taken to be the sum-total of individual utilities, and each individual utility was taken to be a function of the income of that individual. The same utility function was taken to apply to all individuals¹².

Even without the restrictive condition of the same utility function for all, but with the basic utilitarian characteristic of a social welfare function additive with equal weights for all individual members, the welfarist maximization program requires that all marginal utilities be equal. So, the space of individual marginal utilities is the first one

¹⁰ Loc. cit., pp. 73-74.

¹¹ John Rawls, loc. cit., p. VII.

¹² Amartya Sen, loc. cit., p. 95.

where equality is required by this approach. With the additional simplifying assumption made by Dalton, the equality condition, then valid for total individual utilities, can be transposed in the space of individual incomes. We should bear in mind that since Adam Smith, the explanation of some kind of social optimality, through the individual utility maximization (invisible hand) process, was explained by economic considerations developed through resources allocation determining the individual income constraint. This resource space, income, emerged as a more familiar space for specifically economic thinking, in contrast with the utility space which can be perceived as the space where economic theory remains connected to the more global social science realm.

After Dalton, utilitarianism was to develop its equality reflection in the income space:

*Since Dalton's measure of inequality operates on utilities as such, it is very exacting on the measurability and interpersonal comparability of individual utilities. It is, in fact, not easy to talk about percentage shortfalls of utility sum-totals from the maximal sum-total (e.g. 'The sum of **utilities** is reduced by 17 per cent'). Atkinson's (1970b) index of inequality, in contrast, operates on incomes, and measures the social loss involved in unequal income distribution in terms of shortfalls of equivalent incomes. Atkinson measures the inequality of a distribution of incomes by the percentage reduction of total income that can be sustained without reducing social welfare, by distributing the new reduced total exactly equally¹³.*

So, we can retain that utilitarianism, the dominant form of welfarism as an approach of social arrangement theory, while being naturally more an economic growth theory than an equalitarian theory, has developed as a by-product equalitarian considerations first in the achievement space of individual marginal utilities, but more operationally, in classical (and neo-classical) economics in the resource space of individual incomes.

A Pragmatic and Humanitarian Reaction to Utilitarianism: the Basic Needs Approach

The basic needs approach is not shaped within a conceptual revision of welfarism and utilitarianism. It is not a proposition for another theory of equality than the one derived from these dominant economic paradigms.

Of concern here [is] which objective is more important: reduction in inequality or meeting basic needs; egalitarianism or humanitarianism... reducing inequality is a highly complex, abstract objective, open to many different interpretations and therefore operationally ambiguous... Removing malnutrition in children, eradicating disease, or educating girls are concrete, specific achievements that meet the basic needs of deprived groups, whereas reducing inequality is abstract...In the case of equality however, no one knows how to achieve (and maintain) it, how precisely to define it, or by what criteria to judge it¹⁴.

¹³ Loc. cit, p.96.

¹⁴ P. Streeten and al., *First Things First, Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries*, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 17-18.

The basic needs approach emerged explicitly in the seventies as a reaction to welfarism in the area of anti-poverty policies:

In formulating policies aimed at reducing poverty, a good deal of attention has been paid in the economic literature to restructuring patterns of production and income so that they benefit the poor. But similar attention has not been devoted to the consumption side. This imbalance is restored if the basic needs objective is placed at the center of the development dialogue where it belongs¹⁵.

This reaction was also against the welfarist growth strategy [the maximization strategy] as the basic policy to eradicate poverty. This policy was based on three justifications¹⁶:

- market forces would spread the benefits of growth widely and speedily,
- progressive taxation, social services, and other government actions would spread the benefits downward,

None of the assumptions underlying these three justifications turned out to be universally true. Except for a very few countries, with special initial conditions and policies, there was no automatic tendency for income to be widely spread. Nor did governments always take corrective action to reduce poverty; after all, governments were themselves often formed by people who had close psychological, social, economic, and political links with the beneficiaries of the concentrated growth process, even though their motives were often mixed. And it certainly was not the case that a period of enduring mass poverty was needed to accumulate capital. It was found that small-scale farmers saved at least as high a proportion of their income as the big landowners and were more productive, in terms of yield per acre, and that entrepreneurial talent was widespread and not confined to large firms. Prolonged mass poverty was therefore not needed to accumulate savings and capital and to stimulate entrepreneurship¹⁷.

Basic needs is a direct approach to the problem of poverty seen as an unacceptable degree of social inequity, with a sense of urgency:

Emphasis on basic needs must be seen as a pragmatic response to the urgent problem of world poverty; as the ultimate objective of economic development, it should shape national planning for investment, production, and consumption¹⁸.

Even if the basic needs approach was more operationally defined at the end-seventies, it has a long history in economics:

Much of what goes under the label of «basic needs» has been contained in previous work on growth with equity, employment creation, integrated rural development, and redistribution with growth. In particular, the emphasis on making the poor more productive has remained an important component of the basic needs approach. Its distinct contribution consists in deepening the income measure of poverty by adding physical estimates of the particular goods and services required

¹⁵ Loc. cit., pp. VII-VIII.

¹⁶ Loc. cit., p. 9.

¹⁷ Loc. cit., pp. 10-11.

¹⁸ Loc. cit., p. IX.

*to achieve certain results, such as adequate standards of nutrition, health, shelter, water and sanitation, education, and other essentials*¹⁹.

The British economist B.S. Rowntree, in his famous study «Poverty: A Study of Town Life», published in 1901, is usually recognized as the first author having seriously analyzed and measured the concept of basic needs. Rowntree has worked essentially on three categories of basic needs, food, house rent and household sundries consisting of boots, clothes and fuel. Interestingly, let's mention that Rowntree used different methods to set up the minimum requirements in each category. For food, he resorted to nutritional standards established by nutritionists for males, females, adults and children. But for household sundries, he resorted to a qualitative approach by asking people their views on what was to be considered as basic requirements. For house rent, he simply took what households were in fact paying.

In reference to the Sen's analytic framework, the basic needs approach positions the equity debate in a space of achievements, not of resources. It looks for a «concrete specification of human needs in contrast (and as a supplement) to abstract concepts» and places «the emphasis is on ends in contrast to means»²⁰. Which are these basic achievements?

[They are] *at present considered to be in six areas: nutrition, primary education, health, sanitation, water supply, and housing and related infrastructure*²¹.

Elsewhere in Streeten, the results to be achieved are described as «adequate standards of nutrition, health, shelter, water and sanitation, education and other essentials»²². Clothing is also mentioned frequently as a possible area (p. 25). In fact, as can be seen from the quotations, the list of basic achievements is usually an open list and there are important debates about what should be this list²³. It is important to understand that «basic needs is not primarily a welfare concept»²⁴. So, in the space of achievements, they do not overlap with utility, the unique achievement looked at by welfarists. For the basic needs school, the achievement space is multidimensional and has a kind of structure generated from priorities defined among the different results to be achieved.

Since the basic needs approach, as we have seen, differentiates itself from the welfarist school essentially in the area of poverty eradication policies, let's conclude with some policy considerations. The basic needs approach suggests and facilitates selective policies. «The crucial factual assumption is that leakages, inefficiencies, and 'trickle-up' (which makes the better-off the ultimate beneficiaries of anti-poverty policies) are smaller in a selective system than in a general system»²⁵. With a strong preoccupation for more targeted interventions:

A basic needs approach calls for decentralization to the village and district level so that plans can be adapted to variable local conditions and the power and efforts of the poor can be mobilized. At the same time, such decentralization often concentrates power in the hands of the local elite, who block policies that would benefit the poor. In the interest

¹⁹ Loc. cit., p. 3.

²⁰ Loc. cit., p. 34.

²¹ Loc. cit., p. 92.

²² Loc. cit., p. 3.

²³ See loc. cit., chapter 1, Interpretations, pp. 25-26.

²⁴ Loc. cit., p. 3.

²⁵ Loc. cit., p. 38.

of the rural poor, decentralization therefore has to be balanced by the retention of power in the central government. It is not an easy task to design an administrative and political structure which is both decentralized for adaptability and flexibility and centralized explicitly for the protection of the poor and the politically weak. Voluntary organizations can also make an important contribution by offering guidance to local leaders on the special needs of the poor²⁶.

But more pro-active state interventions to insure the satisfaction of the basic needs for everybody could have economic effects which are not to be overlooked:

A major difficulty of a basic needs approach is that efforts to meet basic needs in a short time, in a society that previously pursued non-basic needs policies, will create disequilibrium in several markets, with macroeconomic repercussions²⁷.

The issue is then to judge if meeting the basic needs of the population is more important than avoiding some turbulence in the economic aggregates.

A Theoretical and Humanist Reaction to Utilitarianism: the Capability Approach

The capability approach to equity developed by A. Sen, relies intellectually for a large part on the Rawlsian theory of justice, as was mentioned earlier. Rawls's conception has itself been developed in opposition to utilitarianism:

Those who criticized them [the brilliant utilitarianist writers Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Mill, etc.] failed, I believe to construct a workable and systematic moral conception to oppose it... What I have attempted to do is to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In this way I hope that the theory can be developed so that it is no longer open to the more obvious objections often thought fatal to it. Moreover, this theory seems to offer an alternative systematic account of justice that is superior, or so I argue, to the dominant utilitarianism of the tradition. My ambitions for the book will be completely realized if it enables one to see more clearly the chief structural features of the alternative conception of justice that is implicit in the contract tradition and points the way to its further elaboration. Of the traditional views, it is this conception, I believe, which best approximates our considered judgments of justice and constitutes the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society²⁸.

Rawls has then developed a specific contract theory , «Justice as Fairness», on which we come back below.

A social contract theory is structurally an ethical theory completely different from a teleological one, like utilitarianism.

²⁶ Loc. cit., p. 58.

²⁷ Loc. cit., p. 58.

²⁸ John Rawls, loc. cit., pp. VII-VIII.

The two main concepts of ethics are those of the right and the good... The structure of an ethical theory is, then, largely determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions. Now it seems that the simplest way of relating them is taken by teleological theories: the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good.²⁹

For utilitarianism, utility is defined as the good, and what is right is to maximize the sum of individual utilities. In contrast, as a contract theory,

*[Justice as fairness] is a deontological theory, one that either does not specify the good independently from the right or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good...Justice as fairness is a deontological theory in the second way. The question of attaining the greatest net balance of satisfaction never arises in justice as fairness; this maximum principle is not used at all³⁰.
...in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good. In contrast with teleological theories, something is good only if it fits into ways of life consistent with the principles of right already on hand³¹.*

Considering justice as fairness just as a special and partial case of a social contract theory, in such a theory, first a set of principles are explicitly stated and agreed to by all members of the society, and this defines what is right. What is good and needs not to be maximized is conditional on this set of principles, which is the central component of the social contract.

A Specific Social Contract Theory: Justice as Fairness

But what is justice as fairness as a particular case of a social contract theory, the one proposed by Rawls in his fundamental work published in 1971, «A Theory of Justice»? Let's have a quick overview.

*There are two principles of justice, which are first expressed that way:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all³².*

*... it should be observed that the two principles... are a special case of a more general conception of justice that can be expressed as follows.
All social values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage³³.*

For the principles of justice to constitute a real social contract, they must be agreed to by all members of the society. To reach this universal agreement, Rawls

²⁹ Loc. cit., p.24.

³⁰ Loc. cit., p. 30.

³¹ Loc. cit., p. 396.

³² Loc. cit., p. 60.

³³ Loc. cit., p. 62.

uses a special mechanism or condition, which he calls the original position of equity (OPE). This condition stipulates that

They [the principles of justice] are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association... These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established.

...

In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain... This explains the propriety of the name «justice as fairness»: it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair³⁴.

Now, these two principles of justice need to be more precise if they are to allow a real social arrangement. In particular, the space where equality is to be assessed, according to the second principle, has to be specified. Seeing the social arrangement as being first a kind of distributive mechanism, Rawls introduces a set of primary goods, to at least start some operationalization of his second principle.

Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all. Of course, this conception is extremely vague and requires interpretation.

*As a first step, suppose that the basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life. For simplicity, assume that the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are **rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth**... These are the social primary goods. Other primary goods such as health and vigor, intelligence and imagination, are natural goods; although their possession is influenced by the basic structure, they are not so directly under its control³⁵.*

³⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 11-12.

³⁵ Loc. cit., p. 62.

We can see that the Rawlsian space of equality includes the domain of economics with income and wealth, but is much larger than only economic. Now, the primary social goods constitute the basis of individual expectations³⁶.

*Thus in applying the second principle I assume that it is possible to assign an expectation of well-being to representative individuals holding these positions*³⁷.

Even with these operational complements, the implementation of the second principle of justice is conditional to the interpretation given to it, and here Rawls clearly differentiates two basic approaches: the principle of efficiency and the difference principle.

*At this point it is necessary ... to explain the principle of efficiency. This principle is simply that of Pareto optimality (as economists refer to it) formulated so as to apply to the basic structure. I shall always use the term «efficiency» instead because this is literally correct and the term «optimality» suggests that the concept is much broader than it is in fact. To be sure, this principle was not originally intended to apply to institutions but to particular configurations of the economic system, for example, to distributions of goods among consumers or to modes of production. The principle holds that a configuration is efficient whenever it is impossible to change it so as to make some persons (at least one) better off without at the same time making other persons (at least one) worse off*³⁸.

It is important to see that this efficiency approach is marked with indifference and indeterminacy. Indifference, because in a socially efficient state, we don't mind about an eventually strong inequality between individual expectations. Indeterminacy, in the sense that if there exists more than one efficient social state, there is no principle of choice among them.

Using the efficiency principle generates two possible interpretations of the second principle of justice: a system of natural liberty or a system of liberal equality. They are described so:

*In the system of natural liberty the initial distribution is regulated by the arrangements implicit in the conception of careers open to talents (as earlier defined). These arrangements presuppose a background of equal liberty (as specified by the first principle) and a free market economy. They require a formal equality of opportunity in that all have at least the same legal rights of access to all social positions. But since there is no effort to preserve an equality, or similarity, of social positions, except insofar as this is necessary to preserve the requisite background institutions, the initial distribution of assets for any period of time is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies*³⁹.

...

The liberal interpretation of the two principles seeks, then, to mitigate the influence of social contingencies and natural fortune on distributive shares. To accomplish this end it is necessary to impose further basic structural conditions on the social system. Free market

³⁶ Loc. cit., section 15.

³⁷ Loc. cit., p. 64.

³⁸ Loc. cit., pp. 66-67.

³⁹ Loc. cit., p. 72.

*arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the overall trends of economic events and preserves the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity*⁴⁰.

So, both systems rely essentially on the free market system as a distributive mechanism, the first one strongly believing that it is efficient by itself, the second one, that it is not and needs to be corrected by state interventions. In both cases, individual differences are not explicitly recognized.

With the difference principle, individual differences are directly acknowledged, either in natural endowment or in social position. Inequality in the distribution of social primary goods can be considered as just under a specific condition, which generates two different interpretations of the second principle of justice, depending on whether the focus is on natural endowment only (Natural Aristocracy) or extends to social position (Democratic Equality).

*On this view [natural aristocracy] no attempt is made to regulate social contingencies beyond what is required by formal equality of opportunity, but the advantages of persons with greater natural endowments are to be limited to those that further the good of the poorer sectors of society. The aristocratic ideal is applied to a system that is open, at least from a legal point of view, and the better situation of those favored by it is regarded as just only when less would be had by those below, if less were given to those above. In this way the idea of 'noblesse oblige' is carried over to the conception of natural aristocracy*⁴¹.

*The democratic interpretation ... is arrived at by combining the principle of fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle. This principle removes the indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency by singling out a particular position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged. Assuming the framework of institutions required by equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate*⁴².

It is immediately seen that a Pareto-efficient social state could be rejected with the difference principle if transferring some primary goods from the better-off to the worst-off improves the situation of the latter.

Among the four possible interpretations of the second principle of justice, Rawls commits himself to the difference principle and to the system of Democratic Equality.

After a long development of all these basic constituents of the social contract named Justice as Fairness, he arrives at a final statement of the two principles of justice.

⁴⁰ Loc. cit., p.73.

⁴¹ Loc. cit., p. 74.

⁴² Loc. cit., p. 75.

First Principle

Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle

Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:

(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and

(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity⁴³.

To these principles correspond two priority rules.

First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)

The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty.

...

Second Priority Rule (The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare)

The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle⁴⁴.

An Adjustment and Complement to Justice as Fairness: the Capability Approach to Equity

In proposing his personal approach to the evaluation of inequality, Sen at the same time recognizes his relationship with Rawls's theory of justice:

Indeed, my greatest intellectual debt is undoubtedly to John Rawls. I am led by his reasoning over quite a bit of the territory, and even when I go in a different direction (e.g. focusing more on the 'extents' of freedoms, rather than on the 'means'-what Rawls calls the 'primary goods'), that decision is, to a considerable extent, based on an explicit critique of Rawls's theory⁴⁵.

The main criticism addressed by Sen to Rawls is relative to informational issues:

A particularly important contrast is that between capability-based evaluation and Rawls's (1971) procedure of focusing on the holding of 'primary goods' (including resources such as incomes, wealth, opportunities, the social bases of self-respect, etc.). This is a part of his 'Difference Principle', which is an integral component of the Rawlsian theory of 'justice as fairness'. While my own approach is deeply influenced by Rawls's analysis, I argue that the particular informational focus on which Rawls himself concentrates neglects some considerations that can be of great importance to the substantive assessment of equality-and of efficiency⁴⁶.

⁴³ Loc. cit., p. 302.

⁴⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 302-303.

⁴⁵ Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. XI.

⁴⁶ Loc. cit., p. 8.

Rawls himself had already admitted his focus on means by choosing the primary goods as the space of equality, and had anticipated the criticisms he would receive on this aspect of his theory:

It may be objected that expectations should not be defined as an index of primary goods anyway but rather as the satisfactions to be expected when plans are executed using these goods. After all, it is in the fulfillment of these plans that men gain happiness, and therefore the estimate of expectations should not be founded on the available means. Justice as fairness, however, takes a different view. For it does not look behind the use which persons make of the rights and opportunities available to them in order to measure, much less to maximize, the satisfactions they achieve⁴⁷.

Rawls is opposed to discuss equality in the space of achievements, as do basically the welfarists and the basic needs supporters. Sen is not opposed to analyse equality in a different space than achievements, and he recognizes that Rawls's theory 'can also be interpreted ... as taking us in the direction of the overall freedom actually enjoyed rather than being confined to the outcomes achieved'⁴⁸.

According to Sen, what is missing in the Rawlsian approach, at least in the informational domain, is an intermediate space between the space of resources or means and the space of achievements. This is precisely the space of freedoms. This will become the essential complement by Sen to the Rawlsian approach to equity. But why did Sen pay so much importance to clearly distinguish between the primary goods and the extents of freedoms? Basically, because there exists a fundamental diversity between human beings.

The importance of the contrast [between the two approaches] once again turns on the fundamental diversity of human beings. Two persons holding the same bundle of primary goods can have very different freedoms to pursue their respective conceptions of the good (whether or not these conceptions coincide). To judge equality-or for that matter efficiency-in the space of primary goods amounts to giving priority to the 'means' of freedom over any assessment of the 'extents' of freedom, and this can be a drawback in many contexts. The practical importance of the divergence can be very great indeed in dealing with inequalities related to gender, location, and class, and also to general variations in inherited characteristics⁴⁹.

Sen's personal views on equity will be developed by giving specific contents to the space of freedoms and to the space of achievements. For the former, he will introduce the term **capabilities**, which specifies the **extents** of freedoms, and for the latter, the notion of **functionings** will describe the **type of outcomes** expected from capabilities.

The term 'functionings' is first required to define what means **well-being**:

*The well-being of a person can be seen in terms of the quality (the 'wellness', as it were) of the person's being. Living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 'functionings', consisting of **beings** and*

⁴⁷ John Rawls, loc. cit., p. 94.

⁴⁸ Amartya Sen, loc. cit., p. 80.

⁴⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 8-9.

doings. A person's achievement in this respect can be seen as the vector of his or her functionings. The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on. The claim is that functionings are constitutive of a person's being, and an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these constituent elements⁵⁰.

The term 'capabilities' is then defined by reference to functionings:

Closely related to the notion of functionings is that of the capability to function. It represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or another. Just as the so-called 'budget set' in the commodity space represents a person's freedom to buy commodity bundles, the 'capability set' in the functioning space reflects the person's freedom to choose from possible livings⁵¹.

Specific functionings (e.g. being adequately nourished) define specific capabilities (e.g. the capability to be adequately nourished). To continue with the 'budget set' analogy, axes in the functioning space correspond to specific capabilities, the extent of which is represented by the axe segment contained in the capability set.

The link between capabilities and well-being requires some explanation, since it has a double aspect.

The relevance of a person's capability to his or her well-being arises from two distinct but interrelated considerations. First, if the achieved functionings constitute a person's well-being, then the capability to achieve functionings (i.e. all the alternative combinations of functionings a person can choose to have) will constitute the person's freedom-the real opportunities-to have well-being. This 'well-being freedom' may have direct relevance in ethical and political analysis.

...

The second connection between well-being and capability takes the direct form of making achieved well-being itself depend on the capability to function. Choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of genuine choice with serious options may be seen to be-for that reason-richer. In this view, at least some types of capabilities contribute directly to well-being, making one's life richer with the opportunity of reflective choice⁵².

Sen insists on what differentiates the capability approach from more well-known ones.

In either form, the capability approach differs crucially from the more traditional approaches to individual and social evaluation, based on such variables as primary goods (as in Rawlsian evaluative systems),

⁵⁰ Loc. cit., p. 39.

⁵¹ Loc. cit., p. 40.

⁵² Loc. cit., p. 41.

resources (as in Dworkin's social analysis), or *real income* (as in the analyses focusing on the GNP, GDP, named-goods vectors). These variables are all concerned with the *instruments* of achieving well-being and other objectives, and can be seen also as the *means* to freedom. In contrast, *functionings* belong to the constitutive elements of well-being. *Capability* reflects freedom to pursue these constitutive elements, and may even have ... a direct role in well-being itself, in so far as deciding and choosing are also parts of living⁵³.

But as utility is also acknowledged as a constituent of well-being, it must be emphasized that

*... the capability approach differs from utilitarian evaluation (more generally 'welfarist' evaluation) in making room for a variety of doings and beings as important in themselves (not just because they may yield utility, nor just to the extent that they yield utility). In this sense, the perspective of capabilities provides a fuller recognition of the variety of ways in which lives can be enriched or impoverished.*⁵⁴

Why should the capability space be chosen as the evaluation space for equality, instead of the functioning space?

*Furthermore, freedom of choice can indeed be of direct importance for the person's quality of life and well-being. The nature of this connection may be worth discussing a bit more. Acting freely and being able to choose are, in this view, directly conducive to well-being, not just because more freedom makes more alternatives available. This view is, of course, contrary to the one typically assumed in standard consumer theory, in which the contribution of a set of feasible choices is judged exclusively by the value of the best element available*⁵⁵.

*...
For example, 'fasting' as a functioning is not just starving; it is choosing to starve when one does have other options. In examining a starving person's achieved well-being, it is of direct interest to know whether he is fasting or simply does not have the means to get enough food. Similarly, choosing a life-style is not exactly the same as having that life-style no matter how chosen, and one's well-being does depend on how that life-style happened to emerge*⁵⁶.

In fact, by developing the concept of freedom in a set of specific capabilities, Sen remains fundamentally in line with the Rawlsian focus on liberty for social justice analysis and evaluation.

The Rawlsian framework is too weak in its informational basis to address the issue of poverty, especially in a perspective of measure. Sen's extension provides this basis and, in fact, it goes through some convergence with the basic needs approach. All functionings and corresponding capabilities do not have the same weight in social equity assessment and we are thus brought to the identification of basic capabilities.

In a previous work, Sen had analysed and criticized the insufficiencies of other approaches to cover the concept of «needs».

⁵³ Loc. cit., p. 42.

⁵⁴ Loc. cit., pp. 43-44.

⁵⁵ Loc. cit., p. 51.

⁵⁶ Loc. cit., p. 52.

My contention is that even the concept of needs does not get adequate coverage through the information on primary goods and utility.

...

It is arguable that what is missing in all this framework is some notion of 'basic capabilities': a person being able to do certain basic things.

...

There is something still missing in the combined list of primary goods and utilities. If it is argued that resources should be devoted to remove or substantially reduce the handicap of the cripple despite there being no marginal utility argument (because it is expensive), despite there being no total utility argument (because he is so contented), and despite there being no primary goods deprivation (because he has the goods that others have), the case must rest on something else. I believe what is at issue is the interpretation of needs in the form of basic capabilities. This interpretation of needs and interest is often implicit in the demand for equality. This type of equality I shall call 'basic capability equality'⁵⁷.

This point of view is reemphasized ten years later:

In the context of some type of welfare analysis, e.g. in dealing with extreme poverty in developing economies, we may be able to go a fairly long distance in terms of a relatively small number of centrally important functionings (and the corresponding basic capabilities, e.g. the ability to be well-nourished and well-centered, the capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, and so forth). In other contexts, including more general problems of economic development, the list may have to be much longer and much more diverse⁵⁸.

The capability definition of poverty then follows naturally:

... it is possible to argue for seeing poverty as the failure of basic capabilities to reach certain minimally acceptable levels. The functionings relevant to this analysis can vary from such elementary physical ones as being well-nourished, being adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, etc., to more complex social achievement such as taking part in the life of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on. These are rather 'general' functionings, but-as was discussed earlier-the specific form that their fulfillments may take would tend to vary from society to society⁵⁹.

Conclusion

We have first considered that poverty is an equity issue and then belongs to political philosophy, more specifically to ethics. As an analytical framework to differentiate approaches to equity, we decided to follow the Sen's one, in which the distinction between resource, freedom and achievement space is a central element, combined with the basic recognition of human diversity.

⁵⁷ Amartya Sen, 'Equality of What?', in *Choice, Welfare and Measurement*, MIT Press, 1982, pp. 367-368.

⁵⁸ Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 44-45.

⁵⁹ Loc. cit., pp. 109-110.

A dominant doctrine since two centuries, in the western industrialized world, is a welfarist theory better known as utilitarianism. It has been developed as a strictly economic view of the best social arrangement, dominated by two concepts: growth and efficiency. Equity is a by-product of aggregate utility maximization, and then consists of equal marginal individual utilities. We recognize in all this what is usually named economic neo-liberalism. From the achievement space reduced to utility, the marginalist analysis transposes equity considerations in the income space as a resource space: income determines the utility level. Poverty is then defined as a socially unacceptable level of income and poverty alleviation policies will mostly try to increase the productivity of the poor.

In contrast to utilitarianism or welfarism is the social contract theory which has also quite old historical roots. John Rawls, with his theory of justice, is the most influential modern philosopher having explored and systematized this approach to ethics. Equity (or justice) is directly and explicitly considered as what should be the basis of the social arrangement and has always priority over growth and efficiency considerations. Social democracy appears as the corresponding natural political regime, in which economics is subordinated to politics. On these theoretical grounds, Amartya Sen proposes his capability approach to equity. The space where equality should be looked for is the freedom space, consisting of a set of specific capabilities defined in reference of corresponding types of achievements called «functionings». Poverty is then defined in reference to a subset of capabilities identified as «basic capabilities», and by unacceptable deficiencies in these basic capabilities. Poverty alleviation policies will then look for empowerment of the poor.

The basic needs school transposes the equity debate from social theory to the policy area, and goes directly to poverty issue. Some types of poverty must be identified and eradicated, with a short term perspective. Without rejecting the productivity approach to poverty alleviation favored by welfarists, it identifies a small set of achievements corresponding to the satisfaction of some basic needs, and requires that poverty alleviation policies insure as quickly as possible that everybody achieves these basic satisfactions. Strictly speaking, this school is not guided by welfarist objectives, neither by freedom considerations, but essentially by humanitarian preoccupations.

In the practical work of identifying and measuring poverty in a society, a lot of methodological choices will have to be done, in which will be revealed implicitly, if not explicitly, the social philosophy supporting these choices. It could be clearly the ethical philosophy of one of the approaches here discussed, or a hybrid of them. It is important to be as conscious as possible of the ethical paradigm dissimulated in apparently inoffensive technical choices, since, through policies leaning on these measurements, the whole social structure will be deeply affected.

Part II : The Concept of Poverty

In the first part, we explored the philosophical background of the concept of poverty, using Sen's framework for the analysis of equality in a given society. According to their different space for equality analysis, we then identified three schools which will be revisited here with a focus on poverty itself, as an unacceptable form of social inequity. Formally, the poverty concept is defined by identifying a uni- or multidimensional subspace for equality, and by specifying a critical level for each dimension. We then have a *poverty space*. The usually difficult and controversial issue of defining a critical level is commonly delayed once operational indicators have been associated to the poverty dimensions (see part III).

Poverty measurement means the production of numbers by which we can assess the overall degree of poverty in a given society and by which we can identify the members of this society which are to be considered as poor. To decide which numbers we are to produce, we need a theory about the object we want to measure. The fact is that there are different theories on poverty. This part is central in the sense that, as will be seen, the concept of poverty mirrors the basic structure of the social arrangement, more specifically the conception of justice, which prevails in this society. That's why debates about poverty are usually extremely passionate, and the economist statistician should be aware of all the implications generated by a work apparently strictly objective and inoffensive due to its technical character.

The literature on poverty is extremely abundant and characterized by an unusual level of ambiguity relative to economic theory. It provides many different definitions of what poverty is, each concept obviously leading to a particular identification of the poor. Hagenaars and de Vos (1988) compared the impact of different definitions on the estimation and composition of poverty and concluded their study in this way:

The choice of a specific poverty definition as the one and only measuring rod thus appears to have major consequences, both for the observed incidence of poverty and for the distribution of the poor over social subgroup.⁶⁰

Furthermore, each concept comes with its own recommendations for addressing poverty reduction. Thus numbers developed to measure poverty play a crucial role in targeting poverty alleviation policies and in assessing the efficiency of different policies. The three main schools of thought concerning poverty are the Welfarist school, the Basic Needs school, and the Capability school. As will be seen, while these three approaches differ in many ways, they all imply that « something », to be defined, doesn't reach a level considered to be a reasonable minimum. That is, a person is judged to be poor whenever he or she is lacking, with respect to the reasonable minimum, the particular « thing » in question. The conceptual debate around poverty arises when taking up the nature of that missing thing. The debate on the nature and level of what should not be lacking to anybody takes us back to the larger issue of equity since it means to formally identify a subspace of the space of equality, and for each dimension in this poverty subspace, to define a minimal level below which a member of this society is characterized as « poor ».

⁶⁰ Aldi Hagenaars and Klass de Vos, K. (1988) "The Definition and Measurement of Poverty", *The Journal of Human Resources*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 p. 220.

The Welfarist School

For the welfarist, «something» means economic well-being. Economic well-being is sometimes referred to as economic welfare⁶¹. Here, we will systematically use the term well-being at the individual level, keeping the word welfare for the aggregate level. Welfarists reduce the broad concept of well-being either directly to the usual economic concept of utility⁶², or either indirectly through the term economic well-being taken as the total consumption level determining utility⁶³. Utility itself is conceived as a psychological feeling like happiness, pleasure, desire fulfillment generated by commodity consumption. The term «standard of living» is another term sometimes used to refer to economic well-being⁶⁴. An example of the definition provided by the welfarist approach is:

"Poverty" can be said to exist in a given society when one or more persons do not attain a level of economic well-being deemed to constitute a reasonable minimum by the standards of that society⁶⁵.

This poverty concept originates mainly from modern micro-economic theory, and derives from the hypothesis that individuals maximize their well-being.

The essence of the approach is the concept of a preference ordering over goods, generally taken to be representable by a "utility function", the value of which is deemed to be a sufficient statistic for assessing a person's well-being. Following this approach, utilities are the basis of social preferences, including poverty comparisons⁶⁶.

In practice, however, the economic well-being of individuals is not directly observable. In addition, because preferences vary from person to person, this approach leads to the formulation of a first principle, that individuals themselves are the only ones who know what truly is in their best interest. From this first principle, with the «invisible hand» classical analysis formalized in modern equilibrium and welfare analysis follows a second one: the state should not intervene too extensively in the economy. That is, what should be produced, how and for whom, should be determined by the unknown preferences of individuals. This approach therefore, recommends that policies pursued should be those that increase productivity, employment, etc, and thus income, in order to alleviate poverty. For the same reasons, it basically falls back on real income and consumption expenses as indicators of economic well-being. While recognizing their limited influence, they are nonetheless preferred over others because they do not favour one good over another, thus leaving room for individual preferences. Therefore, the welfarist school is also identified with what is called the "the income approach to poverty".

The welfarist school is currently the dominant approach and until recently was seen as the unique norm. In fact, as a leader among organizations, the World Bank strongly promotes the welfarist concept.

⁶¹ Michael Lipton and Martin Ravallion, "Poverty and Policy", chapter 41 in Handbook of Development Economics, Volume III. Edited by J.Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan, Elsevier Science, 1995, p. 2553 and Martin Ravallion, *Poverty Comparisons*, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1994, p. 4.

⁶² Jan Tinbergen, "On the Measurement of Welfare", *Journal of Econometrics*, Vol.50,1991,p.7.

⁶³ Martin Ravallion, loc. cit., p.8.

⁶⁴ Loc. cit., p.4.

⁶⁵ Loc. cit., p.3.

⁶⁶ Loc. cit., p. 5.

The Basic Needs School

This school considers that the «something» that is lacking in the lives of the poor is a small subset of goods and services specifically identified and deemed to meet the basic needs of all human beings. The needs in question are called «basic» in the sense that their satisfaction is seen as a pre-requisite to quality of life; they are not initially perceived as generators of well-being. As Lipton says, you have to "be" before you can "well-be"⁶⁷. "Basic needs is not primarily a welfare concept"⁶⁸. Instead of focusing on utility, the attention is here on individual requirements relative to basic commodities. In the traditional BN approach, the basic goods and services usually include⁶⁹: food, water, sanitation, shelter, clothing, basic education, health services, and public transportation. As we can see, these needs go beyond the needs necessary for existence, generally known as minimal needs which only include adequate nutrition, shelter and clothing. Even before addressing the issue of what means «enough», the subset of basic commodities is understood to be different according to sex and age: children, and women require specific health services, basic education may mean primary school enrolment for a 7-year old child and functional literacy for an adult, etc.

The definition of poverty adopted by the government of the Philippines is an example of this approach taken in its broad sense :

*... the sustained inability of a family to meet its basic needs for survival (food and nutrition, water and sanitation, health and clothing), security (income, shelter, peace and security), and empowerment (basic education and functional literacy, psychosocial and family care, and participation in political process).*⁷⁰

One of the main problems which confront this school is the simple determination of what the basic needs are. It is generally nutritionists, physiologists and other specialists who are called on to determine the basic needs of individuals. However, they are not always in agreement with one another. "Unfortunately, the precise measurement of minimum needs - particularly nutritional needs, their largest component - is extremely difficult, and the subject of intense debate." (Cutley, 1984, p.1120). In the area of nutrition, the problem is that needs vary not only based on age and gender, but also based on the types and level of activity of an individual. However, individuals choose their activity level. Given these conditions, should we conclude that the nutritional needs of an individual with a diet that is light yet sufficient given a low level of activity, are satisfied? Or is a satisfactory diet the cause of a voluntary decrease in activity? The answer is crucial in the identification of the poor. We will return to these questions later, when discussing poverty lines.

This school ranks second to the welfarist school in importance. Although its origins date to the early 1900s with the studies of Rowntree, it did not truly take form until the 1970s, when it arose in reaction to the inattention paid to the needs of individuals.

⁶⁷ Quote in N. Kabeers, "Beyond the Poverty Lines: Measuring Poverty and Impoverishing Measures" in *Reversed Realities, Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought*, 1994, Verso, London, p.162.

⁶⁸ Alejandro N. Herrin, "Designing Poverty Monitoring Systems for MIMAP", paper presented at the *Second Annual Meeting of MIMAP*, 1997, May 5-7, IDRC, Ottawa, p. 3.

⁶⁹ See Paul Streeten, "Poverty Concepts and Measurement", chapter 2 in *Poverty Monitoring : An International Concern*. Edited by R. Anker and R. van der Hoeven, p.25, Alejandro N. Herrin, loc. cit, pp.10-11, and Paul Streeten and Associates, *First Things First, Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries*, World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 3.

⁷⁰ Alejandro N. Herrin, loc. cit., p. 11.

In the past two decades, those concerned with development have sometimes got lost in the intricacies of means - production, productivity, saving ratios, and so on - and lost sight of the end. [...] The basic needs approach recalls the fundamental concern of development, which is human beings and their needs.⁷¹

Even though it recognizes the good intentions of policies oriented towards raising revenue in the fight against poverty, this approach promotes instead policies more precisely aimed at the satisfaction of basic needs.

The hypothesis of the basic needs approach is that a set of selective policies makes it possible to satisfy the basic human needs of the whole population at levels of income per head substantially below those required by a less discriminating strategy of all-round income growth - and it is therefore possible to satisfy these needs sooner. If military but apt metaphor is permitted, the choice is between precision bombing and devastation bombing.⁷²

This hypothesis itself rests on two premises. First, that the "...leakage, inefficiencies, and "trickle-up" (which makes the better-off the ultimate beneficiaries of anti-poverty policies) are smaller in a selective system than in a general system." (Streeten et al., 1981, p. 38) Second, that the raising of revenue of poor households is not the best way of increasing the satisfaction of their basic needs. Some of the reasons given are as follows: (1) basic needs in education, health, water, and in hygiene are more easily satisfied by public services than by increases in revenue; (2) individuals do not always efficiently use their revenue increases to improve their nutrition and their health; (3) there is a poor distribution of resources within households.

The Capability School

For this school, the "thing" that is lacking refers neither to utility nor to the satisfaction of basic needs, but to human abilities, or capabilities. This approach, which was born in the 1980s and whose principal advocate was Amartya Sen, was not originally developed with poverty in mind. The vision of Sen was much more global; to develop a new concept of what has value for the human being. "Its roots lie in the rejection of the "welfarist" paradigm in which individual utility is taken to be the sole metric of welfare, and the sole basis for social choice."⁷³ While not denying the role played by utility in the value of someone's life, Sen believe that the value of someone's life has many other constitutants than utility,

The capability approach differs from utilitarian evaluation (more generally "welfarist" evaluation) in making room for a variety of doing and being as important in themselves (not just because they may yield utility, nor just to the extent that they yield utility). In this sense, the perspective of capabilities provides a fuller recognition of the variety of ways in which lives can be enriched or impoverished,⁷⁴

⁷¹ Paul Streeten et al., loc. cit., p.21.

⁷² Loc. cit., p. 38.

⁷³ Michael Lipton and Martin Ravallion, loc. cit. p.2566.

⁷⁴ Amartya Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992, p.44.

and depends in fact on a set of ways of “being” and of “doing”, which he groups under the general term of “functionings”.

Living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated "functionings", consisting of being and doing.[...] The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on. [...]

Closely related to the notion of functionings is that of the capability to function. It represents the various combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that the person can achieve. [...] Capability is, thus, a set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or another. Just as the so-called "budget set" in the commodity space represents a person's freedom to buy commodity bundles, the "capability set" in the functioning space reflects the person's freedom to choose from possible livings.⁷⁵

Let's take Sen's classical example,

Take a bicycle. It is, of course, a commodity. It has several characteristics, and let us concentrate on one particular characteristic, viz., transportation. Having a bike gives a person the ability to move about in a certain way that he may not be able to do without the bike. So the transportation characteristic of the bike gives the person the capability of moving in a certain way. That capability may give the person utility or happiness if he seeks such movement or finds it pleasurable. So there is, as it were, a sequence from a commodity (in this case a bike), to characteristics (in this case, transportation), to capability to function (in this case, the ability to move), to utility (in this case, pleasure from moving).⁷⁶

So, functionings are achievements, where having utility is an example, while capability to function refers to the liberty to choose from among different functionings. Since “acting freely and being able to choose are, in this view, directly conducive to well-being”⁷⁷, the value of someone's life is better seen in terms of capabilities than functionings.

The capability school will thus consider as poor a person that doesn't have the possibility to achieve a certain subset of functionings.

The functionings relevant to this analysis can vary from such elementary physical ones as being well-nourished, being adequately clothed and sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity, etc, to more complex social achievements such as taking part in the life of the community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on. These are rather "general" functionings, but ...the specific form that their fulfillments may take would tend to vary from society to society.⁷⁸

Therefore, for this school, "something" means neither utility nor satisfied basic needs, but some capabilities seen as minimally acceptable.

⁷⁵ Loc. cit., p.39-40.

⁷⁶ Amartya Sen, "Poor, relatively speaking", *Oxford Economic Papers*, vol. 35, 1983, p.160.

⁷⁷ Amartya Sen, 1992, loc. cit., p.51.

⁷⁸ Loc. cit., p.110.

Looking at capabilities and functionings instead of commodities obliges one to take into consideration personal characteristics.

Perhaps the most important point to note is that the adequacy of the economic means cannot be judged independently of the actual possibilities of "converting" incomes and resources into capability to function. The person with a kidney problem needing a dialysis ... may have more income than the other person, but he is still short of economic means (indeed of income), given his problem in converting income and resources into functionings. If we want to identify poverty in terms of income, it cannot be adequate to look only at incomes (i.e. whether it is generally low or high), independently of the capability to function derivable from those incomes. Income adequacy to escape poverty varies parametrically with personal characteristics and circumstances.⁷⁹

Since this approach is quite recent and strives above all to elaborate a new concept of well-being, its applications to poverty are few. The development of UNDP indicators are one attempt, as are the works of Desai⁸⁰ (promotes an indicator of poverty based on faculties), and Hossain.⁸¹ For the same reasons, this approach, as opposed to the others, does not have a political agenda.


⁷⁹ Amartya Sen, 1992, loc. cit., p.111

⁸⁰ M. Desai, "Poverty and Capabilities: Towards an Empirically Implementable Measure" in *The Selected Essays of Meghnad Desai*, Volume 2, Economist of the Twentieth Century Series, Aldershot UK, Elgar, 1995.

⁸¹ I. Hossain, *Poverty as Capability Failure*, Helsinki: Swedish School of Economics, 1990.

Comparison and Critique of the Different Concepts of Poverty

Figure 1 below tries to summarize the three approaches.



The boundaries of the function and the capacity groups are dashed because the group of functions that individuals should be «capable » of attaining is not yet clearly defined. Other functions, and thus other capacities, could probably also be included.⁸²

There are basically four points which come out of the diagram. First, only basic needs and functions have elements in common (having adequate food, clothing and lodging). Second, the functions and needs can provide utility. Third, some basic needs formulated in terms of « access » are capacity generators.

*In so far as the underlying reasoning of the basic needs approach related to giving people the means of achieving certain basic functionings, the problem of interpersonal variations in "transforming" commodities into functionings - discussed earlier- can also be avoided by directly looking at the functioning space rather than at the commodity space.*⁸³

*The value of living standard lies in the living, and not in the possessing of commodities, which has derivative and varying relevance.*⁸⁴

⁸² The group of relevant functions here does not include all the possible ways of being and of doing, but only those with an impact on poverty. In a more general context, economic well-being could clearly be included. Desai (1995) identifies instead the following minimal capacities : (1) ability to stay alive and to profit from an extended life, (2) capacity to ensure one's reproduction (biological), (3) capacity to stay healthy, (4) capacity to interact socially, (5) capacity to obtain knowledge and to think and express oneself freely.

⁸³ Amartya Sen, 1992, *loc. cit.*, p. 109.

⁸⁴ Amartya Sen, *The Standard of Living*, The Tanner Lectures, Clare Hall, Cambridge 1985, 1987, p. 25.

Fourth, contrary to the other two approaches, the welfarist concept of poverty is one-dimensional.

The use of economic well-being to characterize poverty by the “welfarist” school can be criticized on two grounds. First, the identification of the poor in a society inevitably implies interpersonal comparisons. However, because economic well-being is seen as a subjective concept, most economists believe that interpersonal comparisons of economic well-being don’t make sense.

... the use of interpersonal comparisons is widely thought to be arbitrary, and many people view these comparisons as meaningless.⁸⁵

Although there is still evidence of the continuation of the discussion, one can state that the majority of economists are prepared to declare that interpersonal comparisons are not possible.⁸⁶

The second criticism aimed at this school attacks the ethics of the concept of economic well-being and is at the heart of the argument, on a conceptual level, of the other two schools. Supposing that the first criticism is resolved, this approach would classify as poor an individual who is materially well-off but not content, and as not poor an individual not financially well-off but nevertheless content. This, for the other schools is inconceivable.

A grumbling rich man may well be less happy than a contented peasant, but he does have a higher standard of living than that peasant; the comparison of standard of living is not a comparison of utilities.⁸⁷

For its part the “welfarist” school presents two arguments on a conceptual level against the other approaches. The first attacks the importance given to preferences. According to the welfarist school, as mentioned earlier, individuals are better placed to judge what is good for them. That is why it is preferable to rely on the choice of the individuals themselves. Consequently, the observation of a person whose basic clothing needs, as determined by experts, are not met for example, does not indicate that that person is poor, but may simply imply that that person prefers not spending too much money on clothes even though he or she has the means. In the same way,

...to conclude that a person was not capable of living a long life we must know more than just how long she lived: perhaps she preferred a short but merry life.⁸⁸

However, this critique doesn't really apply to the capability school as its name implies, because it's not the achieved functioning that matters but rather the capacity to achieve it.

The second argument deals with the multidimensional aspect of these approaches. The problem is as follows. If we have two individuals whose every need is satisfied but one (for one individual it is education, for the other it is nutrition), how do we determine which of these two is the poorer? This type of question is commonly

⁸⁵ Amartya Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare*, Holden-Day, Oliver and Boyd, 1970, p. 4.

⁸⁶ Stavros A. Drakopoulos, "The Historical Perspective of the Problem of Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", *Journal of Economic Studies*, 1989, Vol. 16, No. 4, p. 35.

⁸⁷ Amartya Sen, "Poor, relatively speaking", *Oxford Economic Papers*, vol. 35, 1983, p. 160.

⁸⁸ Michael Lipton and Martin Ravallion, loc. cit., p.2566

known as the aggregation problem. That is, how should the different elements be aggregated to reduce the analysis to a single dimension.

*Non-welfarist approaches, on the other hand, typically offer little practical guidance on how multiple criteria in defining well-being should be aggregated.*⁸⁹

With the exception of the consensus that nutritional needs are the most important element, this question has not yet been convincingly answered.

Attempts at conciliation have been initiated by the school of basic needs. It has been proposed for example that immaterial needs such as "...the needs for self-determination, self reliance, and security, for the participation of workers and citizens in the decisions-making that affects them, for national and cultural identity, and for a sense of purpose in life and work."⁹⁰ be considered as basic needs. By making this inclusion, the basic needs school would overlap with the capabilities approach. Others have proposed as viewing basic need "...as the satisfaction of consumers' wants as perceived by the consumers themselves"⁹¹, which would bring it close to the welfarist approach.

⁸⁹ Martin Ravallion, loc.cit., p.9.

⁹⁰ Paul Streeten et al., loc. cit., p.34.

⁹¹ Loc. cit., p.25.

Part III Poverty indicators

Definition

Agreeing on the significance of the term "poverty" is insufficient for identifying the poor. It is not sure that what we would like to measure is actually measurable or is measurable at a low cost. In fact, neither economic well-being, nor the satisfaction of needs, nor the capacities of an individual, are directly observable. Given these conditions, it becomes necessary to use observable variables that allow for the approximation of what we refer to by the term poverty. These variables are known as indicators. More than one indicator may be needed to describe a poverty dimension. A poverty indicator can be defined as follows:

A " proxy " variable that is measurable and is as close as possible to a particular dimension specified in poverty.

Example 1

Poverty dimension : economic well-being.
Indicator : total annual household expenditure.

Example 2

Poverty dimension : being well nourished.
Indicator : mean daily consumption of a staple food like rice.

Example 1 would here be the case where direct measurement of permanent income is not directly measurable. In example 2, it could be too costly to realize a large scale nutrition survey measuring all food consumption.

Indicators can be of a direct or indirect nature. An indicator of a poverty dimension is said to be a direct indicator if it intends to measure the poverty dimension in itself. On the other hand, an indicator of a poverty dimension is said to be an indirect indicator if it affects the poverty dimension or if it is a consequence of it. In example 1, the total annual household expenditure is an indirect estimator of the economic well-being, since it affects the economic well-being that a household can reach. The mean daily consumption of a staple food such as rice in example 2 is rather a direct indicator of being well-nourished. An example of an indirect (consequence) indicator for being well-nourished could be the body mass index. It is important to note that an indicator can be a direct indicator for one poverty dimension but an indirect indicator for another dimension. Again, the reasons for choosing indirect indicators are related to measurement or cost problems.

A **poverty indicator** should not be confounded with a **poverty measure** neither with a **poverty index**. Poverty measures or indices require that we go further with the poverty indicator, by giving a precise meaning to a critical level usually called **poverty line**. These two last concepts are most frequently used when the indicator is a numerical variable. Let's y be a numerical poverty indicator measured on a statistical unit U , and let's y^* be the poverty line. A poverty measure is any function of (y, y^*) like : $y < y^*$, $y^* - y$, etc. It's a number taking its value at the statistical unit level. A poverty index is any function of the set of values y for a population group, eventually for the whole population. E.g., we should not confound the household income indicator y , with the fact that this household is poor (poverty measure) according to a poverty line ($y < y^*$), neither with the percentage of poor households in the population (poverty index).

Characteristics

To be useful in a conceptual framework focussing on poverty measurement, the notion of indicator needs to be developed as a **typology** of poverty indicators, which require associating a set of **characteristics** to each poverty indicator. Obviously, there are a lot of possible characteristics that can be considered. In view of operationality, we will retain essentially only four characteristics : area, level, frequency, age-sex group.

- Area
By the area of a poverty indicator is meant a domain of individual or social life where poverty can be revealed. A classification by area is closely linked to the dimensions of poverty. We retain here the following areas :
 1. Nutrition / Food Security
 2. Health / Sanitation
 3. Income
 4. Birth Control
 5. Assets
 6. Education / Information
 7. Housing
 8. Land / Agriculture
 9. Civil Security
 10. Personal Dignity
 11. Public Expenditure / Good
 12. Credit
 13. Social Implication
 14. Vulnerability to Crisis
 15. Housework
 16. Economic Infrastructure
 17. Labour
 18. Rights / Liberties
 19. Self-perception
 20. Clothing

- Level
By the level of a poverty indicator, we understand the smallest (lowest) statistical unit where it can be significantly observed, as revealing an aspect of poverty. The different levels can be :
 1. Individual
 2. Household
 3. Community (hamlet, village, commune, etc.)
 4. Region
 5. Country

Obviously, an indicator at a given level provides, by aggregation, a similar indicator at superior levels : crop production at household level generates the *mean* crop production at village level, etc. These *induced indicators* will in fact generally belong to the *index* category defined above. Inversely, we can observe if there has been a child mortality in a household, but it does not mean that this household is poor per se. On the other hand, the child mortality rate is significant at the community or region level. And an individual could be considered as poor, relatively to a specific dimension, if he lives in a community (region) where the child mortality rate is high (*poverty by membership*).

- Frequency

We define the frequency of a poverty indicator the *expected* periodicity of its measurement, taking into account its *variability* across time (*sensitivity*) :

1. Short term : one year or less
2. Mean term : from one to less than five years
3. Long term : five years or more.

In a report referring to an operational PMS, the *de facto* periodicity of measurement would be given, according to the classification above.

- Age-sex Group

From our standpoint, there are many dimensions of poverty which are gender-specific and age-group specific. And for poverty alleviation policies, it is essential to measure these specific dimensions of poverty. Thus, whatever be its measurement level, an indicator can be specific to women, to children, to aged persons, etc. In addition to the sex classification, we propose to describe the relevance of indicators relatively to the following age-groups, the age-intervals obviously to be adapted locally :

1. New-born (0-12months)
2. Pre-school (1+ - 6)
3. School age (6+ - 15)
4. Adult-1 (15+ - 45) : in labour force, + fecundity period for women
5. Adult-2 (45+ - 60) : in labour force
6. Old age (60+)

Indicators Favoured by the Different Schools

The three poverty concepts discussed in parts I and II, by specifying what is missing differently, necessarily favour certain indicators over others. Good proxies for economic well-being, are not necessarily the same as good proxies for basic needs satisfaction or capacities. Without studying how each indicator is situated in relation to the three schools (because there are many indicators) we will try to determine which ones are preferred by each school.

For the welfarist school, an individual is poor when he/she lacks economic well-being. The subjectivity of the concept, combined with the fact that it is unobservable, makes evaluation of economic well-being very hazardous. As a result, the welfarist school falls back on income and expense type indicators. While recognizing the limited influence of these variables, they are nonetheless preferred over other indicators because they do not favour one good over another, thus leaving room for the preferences of individuals.

Once again, it is difficult and costly to directly observe the satisfaction of basic needs. Indicators favoured are thus *proxies* of their satisfaction. We can think of indicators in the area of nutrition, education, health, lodging and clothing, favouring indicators of accomplishment with respect to indicators of access. For example, an indicator such as the number of cases of certain diseases per 100,000 inhabitants (tuberculosis, etc.) would be preferred to the number of doctors per 100,000 inhabitants.

On the other hand, the capacity school favours access indicators above all. Desai (1995), who tried to make the approach operational, also suggested using the death rate and life expectancy, disaggregated by sex and age group, to judge the

capacity of individuals to prevent avoidable death and illness, as well as all indicators of basic needs satisfaction. In terms of capacity to socially interact, Desai proposes using indicators of rights to associate with others.

A Table of Indicators

Once some form of consensus has been reached on a poverty concept, the implementation of a poverty monitoring system requires selecting a set of indicators for which data collection activities will be planned (surveys, etc). What has been done elsewhere is always a useful reference for our own thinking on these operational issues.

To facilitate this work, a table of indicators found in the poverty measurement literature is presented in appendix. In addition to the identification columns, including the source where the indicator comes from, the four characteristics described in the preceding section are tentatively specified for each indicator. Everything is open to debate, especially the issue of linking these indicators to the three main schools on poverty referred to in parts I and II .

Needless to say, this table is in constant development and open to all suggestions and additions.

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Appendix - A Table of Poverty Indicators

sorted by level, sex group and area

Table Legend

COLUMN 1. NUMBER
COLUMN 2. INDICATOR NAME
COLUMN 3. DEFINITION

COLUMN 4. AREA FROM WHICH POVERTY IS SHOWN

1 = Nutrition / Food Security	6 = Education/Information	11 = Public Expenses/Good	16 = Economic Infrastructure (road, market, etc.)
2 = Health / Sanitation	7 = Housing	12 = Credit	17 = Labour
3 = Income	8 = Land and Agriculture	13 = Social Implication	18 = Rights and Liberties
4 = Birth Control	9 = Civil Security	14 = Vulnerability to Crisis	19 = Perceptions of Poverty
5 = Assets	10 = Personal Dignity	15 = Housework	20 = Clothing

COLUMN 5. SMALLEST LEVEL THAT CAN BE SIGNIFICANTLY OBSERVED AS REVEALING AN ASPECT OF POVERTY

I = Individual
H = Household
C = Community
R = Region
N = National

COLUMN 6. EXPECTED FREQUENCY OF ITS MEASUREMENT

ST = one year or less
MT = from one year to less than five years
LT = five years or more

COLUMN 7. SEX GROUP CONCERNED

A = All sexes
F = Female
M = Male
U = Undistinguishable between male and female

COLUMN 8. AGE GROUP CONCERNED

A = All ages
A0 = New-born (0 to 12 months)
A1 = Pre-school (1 to -6)
A2 = School (+6 to -15)
A3 = Adult-1 (+15 to -45)
A4 = Adult-2 (+45 to -60)

A5 = Old Age (60+)
A1+ = A1, A2, A3, A4, A5
A2+ = A2, A3, A4, A5

.....

U = Undistinguishable between ages

COLUMN 9. REFERENCES

1 = MIMAP Indicators.

2 = MIMAP Country Indicators.

3 = Human Development Indicators, UNDP.

4 = World Development Indicators, WB.

5 = Indicators for monitoring poverty reduction, Carvalho and White WBDP 254, 1994.

6 = Core Welfare Indicators CWIQ, WB.

7 = Designing poverty monitoring systems for MIMAP, Alejandro N. Herrin, May 97.

Individual Level

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
218	BODY MASS INDEX	WEIGHT DIVIDED BY HEIGHT ²	1	I	ST	A	A1+	2
219	CIRCUMFERENCE OF ARMS		1	I	ST	A	A1	2
5	WASTING	WEIGHT FOR HEIGHT	1	I	MT	A	A	2
6	UNDERWEIGHT	WEIGHT FOR AGE FOR CHILDREN LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD	1	I	ST	A	A1	2, 3
7	STUNTING	HEIGHT FOR AGE FOR CHILDREN LESS THAN 15 YEARS OLD	1	I	LT	A	A1	2
11	BREAST-FEEDING EARLY WEANING	INFANT AGED BETWEEN 4 MONTHS AND 2 YEAR OLD NO LONGER BREAST	1	I	ST	A	A0	2
36	ADULT BODY MASS INDEX (BDI)	FOOD ENERGY DEFICIENCY AS A FUNCTION OF THE INDEX OF STANDARD BODY MASS FOR A GIVEN AGE BMI=WEIGHT/HEIGHT ²	1	I	ST	A	A3+	4
22	IMMUNIZATION	TO NOT BE IMMUNIZED AGAINST SPECIFIC ILLNESS: POLIO, TUBERCULOSIS, MEASLES AND D.T.C.	2	I	ST	A	A1	3
27	ILLNESS	NUMBER OF SICK DAYS IN THE LAST 30 DAYS	2	I	ST	A	A	2
30	INCIDENCE OF JUVENILE DIARRHEA	MORE THAN ONE EPISODE PER CHILD UNDER 5 YEARS OLD DURING A CERTAIN PERIOD	2	I	ST	A	A1	2, 7
236	EMPLOYMENT INCOME		3	I	ST	A	A3+	2
237	MINIMUM MONTHLY EXPECTED INCOME BY UNEMPLOYED YOUTH IN THE HOUSEHOLD		3	I	ST	A	A3	2
132	FINANCIAL RESERVES IN THE HOUSE DURING THE QUIET SAISON	HAVING A SMALL AMOUNT OF MONEY AT THE HOUSE DURING THE QUIET SAISON AT ALL TIMES (FUNCTION OF LOCAL CONDITIONS)	3	I	ST	A	A3+	7
131	SCHOOL ABSENTEEISM DURING HARVEST TIME	WITHDRAWAL OF CHILDREN FROM SCHOOL DURING THE AGRICULTURAL SEASON	6	I	ST	A	A2	7
43	ADULT LITERACY	PERSON AGED 15 AND ABOVE WHO CAN, WITH UNDERSTANDING, READ AND WRITE A SHORT, SIMPLE STATEMENT ON HER EVERYDAY LIFE	6	I	MT	A	A3+	1, 2, 3, 4, 7

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
269	SOURCE OF BORROWING	FORMAL OR INFORMAL	12	I	MT	A	A3+	2
270	NEED FOR CREDIT		12	I	ST	A	A3+	2
110	ACCESS TO ORGANIZATIONS IN A RURAL AREA	ADULT HAVING A MEMBERSHIP IN A FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION, BY SEX	13	I	ST	A	A3+	1, 7
111	PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL DECISION-MAKING IN A RURAL AREA	ADULT PARTICIPATING IN LOCAL DECISION-MAKING, BY SEX	13	I	ST	A	A3+	2, 7
112	POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1)	ADULT INVOLVED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, BY SEX	13	I	ST	A	A3+	1, 2, 7
113	POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2)	ADULT REGISTERED ON LOCAL ELECTORAL LIST (ABLE TO VOTE IN ELECTIONS)	13	I	ST	A	A3+	7
114	PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT	ADULT INVOLVED IN AT LEAST ONE DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, BY SEX	13	I	ST	A	A3+	7
115	PARTICIPATION OF POPULATION IN PROJECTS	PARTICIPATION IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF NEEDS FELT	13	I	ST	A	A3+	7
122	KNOWLEDGE OF INPUT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM	DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE BY VILLAGERS OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS IN AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION	13	I	ST	A	A3+	7
123	KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM	DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE BY VILLAGERS OF VULGARISATION SERVICES, GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND NGO SERVICES	13	I	ST	A	A3+	7
141	DEGREE OF SATISFACTION OF SERVICES BENEFICIARIES	INTERMS OF BASIC HEALTH, EDUCATION, LEISURE, WATER ROUTE, ETC.	13	I	MT	A	A	7
117	CRISIS COPING CAPACITIES (2)	DEPENDANCE ON SOCIAL AID IN PAYMENTS AND SERVICES	14	I	MT	A	A3+	7
76	CONCENTRATION OF WORK, LABOR INTENSITY	PERSON EMPLOYED IN A SECTOR RECOGNIZED AS BEING PRECARIOUS	17	I	ST	A	A3+	7
120	WORKLOAD	DAILY TIME GIVEN TO CERTAIN TASKS, BY SEX	17	I	MT	A	A	7
159	UNDEREMPLOYMENT	EMPLOYED PERSON WORKING LESS THAN HE/SHE WANTS DUE TO LACK OF OPPORTUNIES	17	I	ST	A	A3+	2, 4
84	SELF EVALUATION BASED ON 3 CATEGORIES	SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION CARD: POOR, NON-POOR, BORDERLINE	19	I	ST	A	A3	7
124	SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF THE POOR	SELF-CATEGORIZATION IN TERMS OF REVENUE, FOOD CONSUMPTION AND LODGING	19	I	ST	A	A3+	7
125	SEFL-GRADATION OF THE POOR	SELF-GRADATION WITH RESPECT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP	19	I	MT	A	A3+	7
126	CHANGE IN POSITION ON THE SCALE OF POVERTY	REASONS FOR CHANGES GIVEN BY THOSE CONCERNED	19	I	MT	A	A3+	7
69	CLOTHING (1)	VALUE OF CLOTHES PURCHASED PER PERSON PER YEAR	20	I	ST	A	A	7
70	CLOTHING (2)	NUMBER OF PAIRS OF SHOES PER PERSON PER YEAR	20	I	ST	A	A	7
71	CLOTHING (3)	NUMBER OF WARM CLOTHES PER PERSON PER YEAR	20	I	ST	A	A	7

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
136	REGULAR WEARING OF SHOES BY WOMEN AND CHILDREN		20	I	MT	A	A	7
57	SCOLARITY AT SECONDARY LEVEL	INDIVIDUAL AGED BETWEEN 13 AND 15 YEARS OLD THAT DOES NOT GO THE TO THE SECONDARY LEVEL	6	I	MT	A	A2	7
10	MATERNAL HEALTH	PREGNANT AND LACTATION MOTHER PROVIDED WITH IRON AND IODINE SUPPLEMENTS	1	I	ST	F	A3	2
226	PREGNANT WOMEN WITH ANAEMIA		2	I	ST	F	A3	2, 3
23	PREVALENCE OF CONTRACEPTION	WOMAN OF CHILD BEARING AGE THAT DOES NOT USE MODERN METHODS OF CONTRACEPTION	4	I	ST	F	A3	3, 4
55	EDUCATION LEVEL OF GIRLS	GIRL AGED BETWEEN 6 TO 12 YEARS GOING TO THE PRIMARY LEVEL	6	I	ST	F	A2	7
86	ACCESS TO LAND FOR WOMEN	AREA EXPLOITED BY A WOMAN WHOSE PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY IS AGRICULTURE	8	I	LT	F	A3	7
119	LAND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS EXPLOITED BY WOMEN (2)	WOMAN HAVING LAND LEASE CONTRACTS AND HARVEST SHARING SUCH AS TENANT FARMING	8	I	ST	F	A3+	7

Household Level

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
228	NATURE OF HEALTH SERVICES UTILIZED BY SEX		2	H	MT	A	A	2
34	ACCESS TO SAFE WATER	HOUSEHOLD NOT ABLE TO ACCESS SAFE WATER IN REASONABLE CONDITIONS (FOR URBANS, MAX. DISTANCE 200 METERS, FOR RURALS, NOT HAVE TO SPENT A DISPROPORTIONATE PART OF THE DAY FETCHING WATER)	2	H	ST	A	A	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
35	ACCESS TO SANITATION	HOUSEHOLD NOT HAVING ACCESS TO SANITARY MEANS OF EVACUATING EXCRETA AND GARBAGE, INCLUDING EXTERIOR LATRINES AND COMPOSTING	2	H	ST	A	A	1, 2, 3, 4
128	NATURE OF INCOME	TEMPORARY OR STABLE BY SEX	3	H	MT	A	A3+	2, 7
129	DIVERSITY OF INCOME SOURCE BY SEX		3	H	MT	A	A3+	1, 2, 4, 7
240	CLOTHING (4)	HOUSEHOLD HAVING ACQUIRED A NEW ITEM DURING LAST SIX MONTHS	20	H	ST	A	A	2
118	FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLD		14	H	MT	F	A3+	6, 7
144	ACCES OF WOMEN TO A FLOUR MILL		15	H	ST	F	A2+	7
4	CALORIE INTAKE PER ADULT EQUIVALENT PER DAY	HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION PER ADULT-EQUIVALENT, TRANSFORMED IN CALORIC EQUIVALENT	1	H	ST	M	U	1, 2
64	REVENUE RENT TO INCOME RATIO	HOUSEHOLD RENT COMPARED TO REVENUE	3	H	MT	M	U	5
210	RICE MEALS	NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE PAST WEEK A MEAL WITH RICE WAS CONSUMED IN THE HOUSEHOLD	1	H	ST	U	U	6
211	MEAT MEALS	NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE PAST WEEK A MEAL WITH MEAT WAS PREPARED IN THE HOUSEHOLD	1	H	ST	U	U	6
212	BREAD	NUMBER OF TIMES IN THE PAST WEEK THE HOUSEHOLD HAD BREAD FOR BREAKFAST	1	H	ST	U	U	6
213	STAPLE FOOD ITEM	RICE, WHEAT BASED OR YAM BASED	1	H	ST	U	U	2
214	NUMBER OF MEALS PER DAY (1)	FULL MEALS WITH STAPLE AND MINIMUM OF TWO SIDE DISHES	1	H	ST	U	U	2
220	HOUSEHOLDS WITH INADEQUATE FOOD ENERGY	BELOW FOOD ENERGY CUT OFF POINT TO BE DEFINED COLLECTIVELY OR BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY	1	H	ST	U	U	2
42	NUMBER OF MEALS PER DAY (2)	HOUSEHOLD HAVING ONE MEAL OR LESS PER DAY	1	H	ST	U	A	7
121	ACCESS TO FOOD	FOODS CONSUMED DAILY, BY THE HOUSEHOLD, BY CATEGORY, PER ADULT-EQUIVALENT	1	H	ST	U	U	7

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
133	DAILY PURCHASE OF NEEDED FOODSTUFFS	DEPENDANCE ON DAY TO DAY PURCHASES FOR SUPPLY OF FOODSTUFFS	1	H	MT	U	U	7
134	CONSUMPTION OF FRESH VEGETABLES IN THE DRY SEASON	OCCASSIONAL CONSUMPTION OF GREEN VEGETABLES IN THE QUIET SEASON	1	H	ST	U	U	7
135	CONSUMPTION OF RICE, MEAT, ETC. ..OUTSIDE OF HOLIDAYS	NON-FESTIVE CONSUMPTION OF RICE, MEAT, ETC.	1	H	ST	U	U	7
140	FOOD SECURITY	STATE OF GRANARIES AND CEREAL RESERVES AND ET TUBER	1	H	ST	U	U	7
197	PACKAGED SOAP	HOUSEHOLD USE OF PACKAGED SOAP FOR BATHING	2	H	ST	U	A	6
198	PAPER TOILET ROLLS	HOUSEHOLD USE OF PAPER TOILET ROLLS	2	H	ST	U	A	6
199	TOOTHPASTE	HOUSEHOLD USE OF TOOTHBRUSH AND TOOTHPASTE	2	H	ST	U	A	6
205	ACCESS TO PIPED WATER		2	H	MT	U	U	2
230	TOILET FACILITY	HOUSEHOLD WITH TOILET FACILITY	2	H	ST	U	U	2
17	ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES	CAPACITY FOR THE HOUSEHOLD TO GO TO A DISPENSARY IN LESS THAN ONE HOUR'S WALK OR TRAVEL	2	H	MT	U	U	2, 3, 4
28	FAMILIAL MORTALITY	AT LEAST ONE CASE OF AVOIDABLE DEATH IN THE FAMILY DURING THE PRECEDING YEAR	2	H	MT	U	U	7
29	RECOURSE TO TRADITIONAL MEDECINE	RATIO OF VISITS TO TRADITIONAL HEALER VERSUS DISPENSARY AND HOSPITAL	2	H	ST	U	U	7
209	NATURE AND EXTENT OF EXPENDITURE AND SAVING ACTIVITIES	COMPONENTS OF INCOME USES	3	H	ST	U	U	2
232	DEPENDANTS	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD'S DEPENDANTS INCLUDING DISABLED AND PERSONS WITH CHRONIC DISEASE	3	H	LT	U	U	2
233	EARNERS IN HOUSEHOLD	NUMBER OF INCOME EARNERS IN HOUSEHOLD	3	H	ST	U	U	2
234	VALUE OF FOOD CONSUMPTION OF AT LEAST A MINIMUM FOOD BASKET	BASED ON EACH COUNTRY'S DIETARY PATTERN	3	H	ST	U	U	2
235	HOUSEHOLD INCOME		3	H	ST	U	U	2
238	HOUSEHOLD WHO SOLD A CERTAIN AMOUNT OR MORE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT	HORTICULTURAL PRODUCTS, MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS, VEGETABLES, CASH CROP, CEREAL CROPS AND LENTILS, ETC.	3	H	ST	U	U	2
239	HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE PATTERN	SHARE OF EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES	3	H	ST	U	U	1, 2
244	HOUSEHOLD WHO PURCHASED A CERTAIN QUANTITY OR MORE OF FOODGRAIN PER YEAR		3	H	ST	U	U	2
2	CONSUMPTION LEVEL	TOTAL EXPENDITURES (FOOD AND NON-FOOD) BY ADULT	3	H	MT	U	U	4

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
		EQUIVALENT						
80	FOOD SHARE	EXPENDITURES ON FOOD AS A % OF TOTAL EXPENDITURE	3	H	ST	U	A	5
89	FLUCTUATION OF HOUSEHOLD ASSETS	HOUSEHOLD EXPERIENCING A RISE OR FALL IN THE QUANTITY OF ITS ASSETS	3	H	MT	U	U	7
90	LOSS OF HOUSEHOLD ASSETS	HOUSEHOLD EXPERIENCING A FALL IN ITS ASSETS	3	H	MT	U	U	7
160	INDICATOR OF THE HOUSEHOLD WEALTH	TANGIBLE GOODS AND FINANCIAL ASSETS	3	H	ST	U	U	4
31	ACCESS TO FAMILY PLANNING	COUPLE HAVING ACCESS TO FAMILY PLANNING	4	H	ST	U	A3	7
32	PRATICE FAMILY PLANNING	COUPLES PRACTICING PLANNING DURING THE LAST 6 MONTHS	4	H	ST	U	A3	7
204	FOAM MATTRESS	HOUSEHOLDS POSSESSING A FOAM MA TTRESS BED	5	H	ST	U	U	6
243	WATCH/CLOCK	HOUSEHOLD WITH A WATCH OR A CLOCK	5	H	ST	U	U	6
265	OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL/NON-AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVE ASSETS		5	H	ST	U	U	1, 2
280	LAND/DWELLING	HOUSEHOLD POSSESS A LAND IN RURAL AREA AND A HOUSE IN URBAN AREA	5	H	LT	U	U	6
130	POSSESSION OF BASIC GOODS	HOUSEHOLD HAVING BASIC NEEDED GOODS	5	H	MT	U	U	7
150	HOUSEHOLD OWNERSHIP OF CONSUMER DURABLES	THE HOUSEHOLD POSSESSES SOME (TO BE DEFINED) OF THE FOLLOWING ASSETS: SEWING MACHINE, RADIO, TV, BIKE, FANS, SOFA SET, REFRIGERATOR, ETC.	5	H	MT	U	U	2, 4, 6
250	HOUSEHOLD ADULT ILLITERACY	HOUSEHOLD WITH ALL MEMBERS ABOVE 14 YEARS OLD ILLERATE	6	H	MT	U	U	2
251	HOUSEHOLD LITERACY	AT LEAST ONE MEMBER OF THE HOUSEHOLD IS LITERATE	6	H	MT	U	U	6
252	HOUSEHOLD HEAD EDUCATION	HOUSEHOLD HEAD HAS RECEIVED SECONDARY EDUCATION	6	H	LT	U	U	6
58	BASIC LITERACY RATE	% OF FAMILY NUMBER OLDER THAN YEARS THAT IS LITERATE	6	H	MT	U	U	7
253	SOURCE OF LIGHTING	HOUSEHOLD USES ELECTRICITY	7	H	ST	U	U	6
255	RENT SHARE IN EXPENDITURE	RENT AS A % OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE	7	H	ST	U	U	2
256	HOUSE'S FLOOR MATERIALS		7	H	MT	U	U	2, 6
257	HOUSE'S WALL MATERIALS		7	H	MT	U	U	1, 2
62	NUMBER OF PERSONS PER ROOM	NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS IN THE DWELLING DIVIDED BY THE NUMBER OF ROOMS	7	H	MT	U	U	1, 2, 5, 6
63	FLOOR AREA PER PERSON	AREA PER OCCUPANT IN METERS ²	7	H	MT	U	U	2, 5
65	HOUSE'S ROOF MATERIALS		7	H	LT	U	U	1, 2, 6, 7
66	SHELTER SECURITY	HOUSEHOLD LIVING IN A DANGEROUS HABITAT	7	H	LT	U	U	2, 7

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
67	HOUSING OWNERSHIP	HOUSEHOLD OWNED A HOUSE OR IS A TENANT	7	H	MT	U	U	7
68	DURABLE HOUSING	MATERIAL THAT WILL LAST FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS	7	H	LT	U	U	7
137	HABITATIONS HAVING A PLACE RESERVED FOR ANIMALS	SEPARATION OF QUARTERS RESERVED FOR HUMANS AND FOR ANIMALS	7	H	LT	U	U	7
258	LANDLESS HOUSEHOLD		8	H	LT	U	U	1, 2
260	OWNERSHIP OF LAND	HOUSEHOLD OWNING A LAND	8	H	MT	U	U	2, 6
85	HOUSEHOLD ACCESS TO LAND FOR AGRICULTURAL	AREA EXPLOITED BY AN AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD	8	H	LT	U	U	7
87	AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD WITHOUT LAND	HOUSEHOLD WHOSE MAIN REVENUE IS FROM AGRICULTURE AND DOES NOT OWN LAND	8	H	LT	U	U	7
88	ACCESS TO COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES	FOREST LANDS, PASTORAL, AGRICULTURAL	8	H	LT	U	U	2, 7
119	LAND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS (1)	HOUSEHOLDS HAVING LAND LEASE CONTRACTS AND HARVEST SHARING SUCH AS TENANT FARMING	8	H	LT	U	U	7
149	NOT BEING ABLE TO DECENTLY BURY THE DEAD		10	H	MT	U	U	7
266	EXTENT OF INDEBTEDNESS	LONG DURATION AND SIGNIFICANT IN RELATION TO INCOME	12	H	ST	U	U	1, 2
267	BORROWING STATE (2)	HOUSEHOLD THAT HAS BORROWED FROM INSTUTIONAL SOURCES DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS	12	H	LT	U	U	2
268	BORROWING STATE (1)	HOUSEHOLD THAT HAS BORROWED FROM INSTUTIONAL SOURCES DURING THE LAST YEAR	12	H	ST	U	U	2
274	RESIDENT HEAD AND SPOUSE	HEAD AND SPOUSE CURRENTLY RESIDING IN THE HOUSEHOLD	14	H	ST	U	U	6
116	CRISIS COPING CAPACITIES (1)	VALUE OF ASSETS SEIZED (DISTRESS SALE) , LAND OR OTHER GOODS	14	H	MT	U	U	7
139	LAVISH EXPENSES	RELATIVE LEVEL OF EXPENSES FOR TRADITIONAL CEREMONIES, CEREMONIAL CLOTHING AND JEWELRY (VULNERABILITY)	14	H	MT	U	U	7
142	FAMILY SOLIDARITY	SUPPORT OF EXTENDED FAMILY PLAYING THE ROLE OF AN EXTENDED SECURITY NET	14	H	MT	U	U	7
143	DOMESTICE ENERGY SOURCES	NATURE AND QUANTITY OF ENERGY USED FOR COOKING FOOD : TRADITIONAL COMBUSTIBLE HEATING WOOD, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, ELECTRICITY, DRIED ANIMAL DUNG	15	H	MT	U	U	1, 2, 7
206	ACCESS TO IRRIGATION WATER		16	H	LT	U	U	2
127	ACCES TO RECREATIONAL SERVICES	TIME OR DISTANCE TO ACCESS THE NEAREST RECREATIONAL SERVICE	16	H	ST	U	U	7
146	ACCESS TO MARKET (1)	TIME OR DISTANCE TO NEAREST MARKET	16	H	MT	U	U	7
286	OCCUPATION OF HOUSEHOLD		17	H	MT	U	U	2

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
287	EMPLOYED HOUSEHOLD	AT LEAST ONE MEMBER OF THE HOUSEHOLD IS EMPLOYED	17	H	ST	U	U	6
271	EXPENDITURE FOR LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES	HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE FOR LEGAL/ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES	18	H	ST	U	U	2, 4
191	FREEDOM TO DETERMINE THE SIZE OF ONE'S FAMILY	TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF ONE'S CHILDREN	18	H	LT	U	A3+	7

Community Level

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
217	CHANGES IN NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF CHILDREN UNDER FIVE YEARS OLD		1	C	ST	A	A1	2
9	LOW BIRTH WEIGHT	NUMBER OF INFANT BORN WEIGHING LESS THAN 2500gr	1	C	ST	A	A0	2, 3
16	INFANT MALNUTRITION	% OF CHILDREN LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD THAT ARE MALNOURISHED	1	C	ST	A	A2	3, 4
229	CARE AT HOME FOR SENIORS		2	C	ST	A	A5	2
12	INFANT MORTALITY RATE (IMR)	NUMBER OF DEATHS OF INFANTS UNDER ONE YEAR OF AGE PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS IN A GIVEN YEAR	2	C	ST	A	A0	1, 2, 3, 4
13	CHILD MORTALITY RATE (CMR)	NUMBER OF DEATHS OF CHILDREN BETWEEN 1 AND 5 YEARS OLD PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS OF THAT AGE IN A GIVEN YEAR	2	C	ST	A	A1	1, 2, 3
246	CHILDREN NOT REACHING GRADE 5	PROPORTION OF CHILDREN STARTING PRIMARY SCHOOL THAT DONT CONTINUE ON TO THE FIFTH GRADE	6	C	MT	A	A2	3, 4
45	RATE OF INSERTION INTO PRIMARY LEVEL SCHOOL	NUMBER OF CHILDREN ENTERING FIRST YEAR INDEPENDANT OF THEIR AGE, EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OF OFFICIAL AGE FOR ADMISSION TO THE FIRST LEVEL OF SCHOOL	6	C	ST	A	A2	4
46	RATE OF CYCLE REPETITION IN PRIMARY SCHOOL	REPEATERS AT THE PRIMARY LEVEL AS A PERCENTAGE OF REGISTRATIONS	6	C	ST	A	A2	4
276	IMMIGRATION (2)	RATE OF IMMIGRATION BY INDIVIDUALS BY SEX IN A YEAR	14	C	ST	A	U	2
278	EMIGRATION (2)	RATE OF EMIGRATION BY INDIVIDUAL BY SEX IN A YEAR	14	C	ST	A	U	2

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
200	CHILD LABOUR	NUMBER OF CHILDREN (14 YEARS OLD OR LOWER) WORKING FOR WAGES LAST YEAR	18	C	ST	A	A2	2
279	CHILD MARRIAGE	NUMBER OF CHILD MARRIAGES (14 YEARS OLD OR LOWER) LAST YEAR	18	C	ST	A	A2	2
24	CAPABILITY OF SAFE AND HEALTHY REPRODUCTION	% OF BIRTHS UNATTENDED BY TRAINED HEALTH PERSONNEL	2	C	ST	F	A3	3
25	MATERNAL ANTITETANUS PROTECTION	% OF PREGNANT WOMEN HAVING RECEIVED AT LEAST TWO DOSES ANTITETANUS VACCINE	2	C	ST	F	A3	7
26	MATERNAL PROTECTION	% OF PREGNANT WOMEN HAVING RECEIVED PRENATAL CARE	2	C	ST	F	A3	7
147	ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE	COST OF MEDICAL CARE FOR FAMILIES	2	C	MT	U	U	7
108	ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL INPUTS	ACCESS TO FEED, FERTILIZERS, WATER AND PESTICIDES	3	C	MT	U	U	7
109	ACCESS TO INDUSTRIAL INPUTS IN RURAL AREA	ACCESS TO CRAFT AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL INPUTS IN A RURAL AREA	3	C	MT	U	U	7
245	ACCESS TO MASS MEDIA	NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, TV	6	C	MT	U	U	2
52	TEXTBOOK-STUDENT RATIO	AVERAGE NUMBER OF TEXTBOOK PER CHILD	6	C	ST	U	A2	5
53	STUDENT LEARNING ACHIEVEMENT	MEASURES OF SCOLARLY LEARNING USING AN APPROPRIATE EVALUATION SYSTEM	6	C	ST	U	A2	4
54	ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL SERVICES	EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AVAILABLE TO THE HOUSHOLD WITHIN A REASONABLE GEOGRAPHIC DISTANCE : PRIMARY SCHOOL, SECONDARY SCHOOL, PROFESSIONAL TRAINING CENTRE	6	C	MT	U	A	2, 4
148	ACCESS TO EDUCATION (1)	EDUCATIONAL FEES FOR FAMILIES	6	C	MT	U	A1-A2	7
254	CHANGED ROOF	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO CHANGED THEIR STRAW ROOF INTO A TIN/TILE/CONCRETE ROOF	7	C	ST	U	U	2
207	PLANTATING OF TIMBER/WOOD/FODDER PLANTS LAST YEAR	PRIVATE LAND/PUBLIC LAND	8	C	ST	U	U	2, 4
208	NUMBER OF ANIMAL DEATHS LAST YEAR	CATTLE, BUFFALO, GOATS	8	C	ST	U	U	2
93	VULNERABILITY TO FINANCIAL EXPULSION	VULNERABILITY TO EXPULSION FOLLOWING PROPERTY CONFLICTS AND UNFOUNDED LITIGATION	9, 18	C	MT	U	U	2, 7
272	HOUSEHOLD IN CRISIS	% OF HOUSEHOLDS FACING CRISIS BY TYPE	14	C	ST	U	U	1
273	CRISIS COPING MEASURE	CRISIS COPING MEASURES ADOPTED BY TYPE	14	C	ST	U	U	1
275	IMMIGRATION (1)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT MIGRATED-IN IN A YEAR	14	C	ST	U	U	2
277	EMIGRATION (1)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT MIGRATED-OUT IN A YEAR	14	C	ST	U	U	2
96	VULNERABILITY TO NATURAL	FLOODS, EARTHQUAKES, EROSION OF RIVER BANK	14	C	LT	U	U	7

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
	DISTRESS							
97	VULNERABILITY TO BAD HARVESTS AND TO FLUCTUATIONS IN THE PRICE OF FOODSTUFFS		14	C	ST	U	U	2, 7
138	INCIDENCE OF EXCLUDED PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY	HOMELESS: ITINERANTS, RESELLERS, PROSTITUTES, ADDICTS AND OTHER UNDOCUMENTED CATEGORIES, SQUATTERS, ALCOHOLISM	14	C	MT	U	U	4
201	EXTENSION SERVICE (2)	SERVICES ACCESSIBLE TO HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS	16	C	ST	U	U	2
202	EXTENSION SERVICE (1)	SERVICES OFFERED BY STATE SPONSORED PROGRAMMES ACCESSIBLE TO HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS	16	C	ST	U	U	2
203	SHOPS	NUMBER OF TEA/OTHER SHOPS	16	C	ST	U	U	2
281	DISTANCE TO NEAREST TOWN	AVERAGE TIME TO REACH NEAREST TOWN	16	C	MT	U	U	2
145	ACCESS TO MARKET (2)	TRANSPORT COST TO THE NEAREST MARKET	16	C	MT	U	U	5
288	WAGE WORKERS	NUMBER OF WAGE WORKERS	17	C	MT	U	U	2
289	PERMANENT FARM LABOURERS	NUMBER OF LONG TERM, PERMANENT FARM LABOURERS	17	C	MT	U	U	2
94	ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL PROTECTION (LEGAL AID)	ACCESS TO SPECIAL MESURES OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL PROTECTION	18	C	LT	U	U	2, 7
161	CIVIL RIGHTS (1)	RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY	18	C	LT	U	U	7

Regional Level

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
221	AIDS CASES	NUMBER OF AIDS CASES PER 100 000 PEOPLE	2	R	MT	A	A	3
222	MALARIA CASES	NUMBER OF MALARIA CASES PER 100 000 PEOPLE	2	R	MT	A	A	3
224	GOITER CASES	NUMBER OF GOITER CASES PER 100 000 PEOPLE	2	R	MT	A	A	2
225	NIGHT BLINDNESS CASES	NUMBER OF NIGHT BLINDNESS CASES PER 100 000 PEOPLE	2	R	MT	A	A	2
227	TUBERCULOSIS CASES	NUMBER OF TUBERCULOSIS CASES PER 100 000 PEOPLE	2	R	MT	A	A	3
39	ORAL REHYDRATION THERAPY USE RATE	PROPORTION OF DIARREAL SICKNESS IN CHILDREN UNDER 5 YEARS OLD NOT TREATED BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF SALTS OR OF A HOMEMADE REHYDRATION SOLUTION	2	R	MT	A	A1	3

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
241	AVERAGE WAGE RATE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR BY SEX		3	N, R	ST	A	A3+	1, 2
72	REAL AVERAGE WAGE RATE IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR BY SEX	REMUNERATION OF PAID AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PER WEEK IN CONSTANT PRICES OBTAINED BY DEFLATING THE NOMINAL SALARY PER PAID WORKER BY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX OF THE COUNTRY (REGION)	3	N, R	ST	A	A3+	5
73	AVERAGE UNSKILLED URBAN WAGES RATE BY SEX	DAILY REMUNERATION OF AN UNQUALIFIED LABOURER WITH NO OTHER SOURCES OF REVENUE	3	N, R	ST	A	A3+	1, 5
44	SCHOOL COMPLETION RATE, PRIMARY	PROPORTION OF CHILDREN REGISTERED IN FIRST YEAR OF PRIMARY SCHOOL THAT SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE CYCLE	6	R	LT	A	A2	7
47	TRANSITION RATE FROM PRIMARY TO SECONDERY)	NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENTERING SECONDARY LEVEL EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN THE LAST CLASS OF THE PRECEDING YEAR'S PRIMARY LEVEL	6	R	MT	A	A2	4
48	PRIMARY GROSS ENROLLMENT RATIO	NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN THE FIRST LEVEL THAT ARE OR NOT OF AGE TO GO EXPRESSED IN % OF THE POPULATION BELONGING TO THE AGE GROUP CORRESPONDING TO THAT EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	6	R	MT	A	A2	1, 2, 4
49	PRIMARY NET ENROLLMENT RATIO	NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN THE FIRST LEVEL THAT ARE OF AGE TO GO EXPRESSED IN % OF THE POPULATION BELONGING TO THE SAME AGE GROUP	6	R	MT	A	A2	1, 2, 4
59	DROP OUT RATE		6	R	ST	A	A2	1, 5
91	INCIDENCE OF CRIME	NUMBER OF CRIME VICTIMS PER CRIME TYPE (MURDER, RAPED, ASSAULT, THEFT, BURGLARY, ECT.) PER CA PITA	9	R	MT	A	A	2, 7
75	UNEMPLOYMENT RATE	ACTIVE PERSON SEARCHING FOR A PAYING JOB OR INDEPENDANT WORK	17	R	ST	A	A3+	1, 2, 7
247	SECONDARY NET ENROLLMENT RATIO	NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN THE SECONDARY LEVEL THAT ARE OF AGE TO GO EXPRESSED AS % OF THE POPULATION BELONGING TO THE SAME AGE GROUP	6	R	MT	A, U	A2	2, 3, 4
21	MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE	NUMBER OF WOMEN DYING DUE TO CHILD BIRTH PER 100 000 LIVE BIRTHS	2	R	MT	F	A3	3, 4
18	DOCTORS	NUMBER OF DOCTORS PER 100 000 PEOPLE	2	R	LT	U	U	3, 5
19	POPULATION PER MEDICAL ASSISTANT	NUMBER OF PEOPLE PER MEDICAL ASSISTANT	2	R	MT	U	U	5
20	HEALTH ASSISTANT	NUMBER OF HEALTH ASSISTANTS PER 1000 INHABITANTS	2	R	MT	U	U	3
242	CHANGE IN CPI	CPI IN RURAL AND URBAN REGIONS	3	R	ST	U	U	2

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
78	LOCAL PRICE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES	MARKET VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCED SPECIFICALLY BY THE POOR	3	R	ST	U	U	7
83	PRICE OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS	UNIT PRICE OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS EXPRESSED AS A PROPORTION OF THE AVERAGE DAILY WAGE	3	R	ST	U	U	7
61	INSTRUCTIONAL TIME		6	R	ST	U	U	7
50	NUMBER OF TRAINED TEACHERS	% NUMBER OF TRAINED TEACHERS IN ACCORDANCE TO NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR EACH LEVEL	6	R	MT	U	A2	4
51	PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO AT PRIMARY LEVEL	AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN PER TEACHER AT PRIMARY LEVEL	6	R	MT	U	A2	5
259	LAND DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE CLASS AND TENANCY		8	R	LT	U	U	1, 2
92	INCIDENCE OF ARMED ENCOUNTERS	NUMBER OF VICTIMS IN ARMED ENCOUNTERS	9	R	MT	U	U	2, 7
56	AVERAGE EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES PER REGISTERED CHILD	EXPENSES FOR THE FUNCTION, ADMINISTRATION, INSPECTION AND SUPPORT OF SCHOOLS, GENERAL ADMINISTRATION AND CONNECTED SERVICES	11	R	ST	U	A2	4
95	EXPENSES ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL PROTECTION	ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL EXPENSES IN THE AREA OF PROTECTION, PER CAPITA.	11	R	LT	U	U	7
103	TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENSES IN RURAL AREAS	TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENSES FOR RURAL AREAS, PER CAPITA	11	R	MT	U	U	7
104	PUBLIC EXPENSES ON EDUCATION AND BASIC HEALTH	EXPENSES ALLOCATED TO PRIMARY TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (PHC), PER CAPITA	11	R	MT	U	U	1, 2, 7
105	PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT	PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AS % TOTAL PUBLIC INVESTMENTS	11	R	MT	U	U	2, 7
106	ACCESS TO INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT		12	R	MT	U	U	1, 2, 7
107	ACCESS TO NON INSTITUTIONAL CREDIT		12	R	MT	U	U	1, 2, 7
99	ECONOMIC DIVERSITY (1)	% OF THE POPULATION IN RURAL AND CRAFTS SECTORS	14	R	LT	U	U	7
100	ECONOMIC DIVERSITY (2)	% OF THE POPULATION IN INFORMAL AND SERVICE SECTORS	14	R	LT	U	U	7
101	ECONOMIC DIVERSITY (3)	% OF THE POPULATION IN INDUSTRIAL AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS	14	R	LT	U	U	7
102	ECONOMIC DIVERSITY (4)	DEGREE OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION	14	R	LT	U	U	7
282	EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR OLD AGED		17	R	MT	U	A5	2

National Level

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
223	PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES	NUMBER OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AS % OF TOTAL POPULATION	2	N	MT	A	A	2, 3
14	LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH	NUMBER OF YEARS NEWBORN CHILD WOULD LIVE IF SUBJECT TO THE MORTALITY RISKS PREVAILING FOR CROSS- SECTION OF POPULATION AT THE TIME OF THEIR BIRTH	2	N	LT	A	U	1, 3, 4
40	MORTALITY RATE BY AGE/SEX GROUP	NUMBER OF DEATHS BY AGE/SEX GROUP PER 1000 LIVE PERSON OF THAT AGE/SEX GROUP IN A GIVEN YEAR	2	N	MT	A	A	2, 3
74	UNSKILLED EMPLOYMENT GENERATION	NUMBER OF JOBS SPECIFICALLY CREATED BY A PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMME	3	N	ST	A	A3+	4
248	TERTIARY ENROLLMENT RATE	NUMBER OF PUPILS ENROLLED IN ALL POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES BY THE POPULATION AGE 20 TO 24 AS % OF THE POPULATION AGE 20 TO 24	6	N	LT	A	A3	3, 4
157	GLOBAL RATE OF ACTIVITY	RELATION BETWEEN ACTIVE POPULATION AND POPULATION OF WORKING AGE	17	N	ST	A	A3+	2, 4
158	REAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE	NUMBER OF ACTIVE PEOPLE DECLARING THEMSELVES WITHOUT WORK AND HAVING RECEIVED NO INCOME DIVIDED BY THE ACTIVE POPULATION	17	N	ST	A	A3+	2, 4
15	TOTAL FERTILITY RATE INDEX	AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN ALIVE TO A WOMAN IN HER LIFETIME, IF SHE WERE TO BEAR AT THE PREVAILING AGE-SPECIFIC FERTILITY RATES	2	N	LT	F	U	3, 4
249	FEMALE TERTIARY STUDENTS	PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE ENROLLED IN ALL POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES	6	N	LT	F	A3	3
152	INDICATOR OF THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN (IPF)	% OF FEMALE (1) PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES (2) DIRECTORS OR HIGH LEVEL MANAGERS, (3) MANAGERS AND TECHNICIANS	13	N	MT	F	A3+	3
194	SEATS IN PARLIAMENT HELD BY WOMEN	SEATS IN PARLIAMENT HELD BY WOMEN EXPRESSED IN % OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SEATS IN PARLIAMENT	13	N	MT	F	A3+	3
195	FEMALE ADMINISTRATORS AND MANAGERS	NUMBER OF FEMALE ADMISTRATOR AND MANAGERS EXPRESSED IN % OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMISTRATORS AND MANAGERS	17	N	MT	F	A3+	3
196	FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS	NUMBER OF FEMALE PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS EXPRESSED IN % OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS	17	N	MT	F	A3+	3
290	WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL	NUMBER OF WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AS A % OF ALL EMPLOYEES AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN GOVERNMENT	18	N	ST	F	A3+	3

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
291	WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS	NUMBER OF WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AT ALL LEVELS AS A % OF ALL EMPLOYEES IN GOVERNMENT	18	N	ST	F	A3+	3
176	RIGHTS OF WOMEN	POLITICAL AND LEGAL EQUALITY FOR WOMEN	18	N	LT	F	A2+	7
3	CALORIE AVAILABILITY PER CAPITA PER DAY	DERIVED FROM FOOD AVAILABILITY ESTIMATE BY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION	1	N	MT	U	U	3
215	DAILY PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF FAT	THE FAT EQUIVALENT OF THE NET FOOD SUPPLY (LOCAL PRODUCTION PLUS IMPORTS MINUS EXPORTS) IN A COUNTRY, DIVIDED BY THE POPULATION, PER DAY	1	N	ST	U	U	3
216	DAILY PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF PROTEIN	THE PROTEIN EQUIVALENT OF THE NET FOOD SUPPLY (LOCAL PRODUCTION PLUS IMPORTS MINUS EXPORTS) IN A COUNTRY, DIVIDED BY THE POPULATION, PER DAY	1	N	ST	U	U	3
1	FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA	AMOUNT OF FOOD WEIGHTED BY VALUE, FOOD QUANTITIES ARE MEASURED EXCLUDING ANIMAL FEED, SEEDS FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD LOST IN PROCESSING	1	N	MT	U	U	3,4
231	PEOPLE LIVING ON LESS THAN 1\$ A DAY (PPP)	PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE LIVING ON LESS THAN 1\$ A DAY AT PURCHASING POWER PARITY	3	N	ST	U	U	4
77	CONSUMER PRICE INDEX LOWER INCOME (CPI)	THE INDEX MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONTENTS OF A BASKET OF GOODS FOR THE POOR	3	N	ST	U	U	7
79	RURAL TERMS OF EXCHANGE	WHOLESALE PRICE OF CEREALS DIVIDED BY THE WHOLESALE PRICE OF MANUFACTURED GOODS	3	N	ST	U	U	5
81	AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT	AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION VALUE	3	N	MT	U	U	5
82	ADDED VALUE OF AGRICULTURE		3	N	MT	U	U	5
98	RURAL WORKERS DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR		3	N	LT	U	U	7
153	FOOD CONSUMPTION % OF TOTAL HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION	VALUE CALCULATED FROM GDP DETAILS	3	N	MT	U	U	4
156	GDP PER CAPITA	TOTAL OUTPUT OF GOODS AND SERVICES FOR FINAL USE PRODUCED BY THE ECONOMY BY BOTH RESIDENTS AND NON RESIDENTS, REGARDLESS OF THE ALLOCATION TO DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN CLAIMS, DIVIDED BY THE POPULATION	3	N	ST	U	U	2, 4
192	ADJUSTED REAL GDP PER CAPITA (1)	LET Y=REAL GDP PER CAPITA AND Y*=AVERAGE WORLD INCOME, THEN ADJUSTED REAL GDP PER CAPITA AS CALCULATED BY ATKINSON FORMULA IS GIVEN BY $= Y^*$ IF $0 < Y^* < Y$ $= Y^* + 2[(Y - Y^*)^{1/2}]$ IF $Y^* < Y < 2Y^*$ $= Y^* + 2(Y^{1/2}) + 3[(Y - 2Y^*)^{1/3}]$ IF $2Y^* < Y < 3Y^*$	3	N	ST	U	U	3
193	ADJUSTED REAL GDP PER CAPITA (2)	LET Y= REAL GDP PER CAPITA THEN, $= (\text{LOG } Y - \text{LOG } Y_{\text{MINIMUM}}) / (\text{LOG } Y_{\text{MAXIMUM}} - \text{LOG } Y_{\text{MINIMUM}})$	3	N	ST	U	U	3

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
261	PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HIGHER EDUCATION	PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HIGHER EDUCATION AS % OF ALL LEVELS	11	N	ST	U	A2	3, 4
262	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (1)	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS % OF GNP	11	N	ST	U	U	1, 2, 4
263	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE (2)	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE	11	N	ST	U	U	1, 2, 4
264	REAL CHANGES IN STATE INVESTMENT IN PUBLIC/WELFARE PROGRAMMES		11	N	ST	U	U	2
283	PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (1)	PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE AS % OF GNP	11	N	ST	U	A2+	1, 3, 4
284	PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (2)	PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURE AS % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES	11	N	ST	U	A2+	1, 3, 4
285	PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION	PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AS % OF ALL LEVELS	11	N	ST	U	A2	3, 4
33	PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA		11	N	ST	U	U	1, 2, 4
162	CIVIL RIGHTS (2)	ACCESS TO INFORMATION, FREE EXPRESSION AND THE LIBERTY TO TEACH	18	N	LT	U	U	7
163	CIVIL RIGHTS (3)	RIGHT OF SURVEILLANCE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS	18	N	LT	U	U	7
164	CIVIL RIGHTS (4)	FREEDOM OF LANGUAGE OF ETHNIC GROUPS	18	N	LT	U	U	7
165	CIVIL RIGHTS (5)	PROTECTION OF THE STATE AGAINST FORCED CHILD AND NON-CHILD LABOUR	18	N	LT	U	U	7
166	CIVIL RIGHTS (6)	PROTECTION FROM EXTRAJUDICIAL ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPINGS	18	N	MT	U	U	7
167	CIVIL RIGHTS (7)	PROTECTION FROM TORTURE AND CONFINEMENT	18	N	MT	U	U	7
168	CIVIL RIGHTS (8)	PROTECTION FROM CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, BODILY ASSAULT, ARBITRARY DETENTION	18	N	MT	U	U	7
169	CIVIL RIGHTS (9)	PROTECTION FROM OBLIGATORY MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS AND PARTIES	18	N	MT	U	U	7
170	CIVIL RIGHTS (10)	PROTECTION FROM IDEOLOGY OR STATE RELIGION IN SCHOOLS	18	N	MT	U	U	7
171	CIVIL RIGHTS (11)	PROTECTION FROM THE CONTROL OF ART	18	N	MT	U	U	7
172	CIVIL RIGHTS (12)	PROTECTION FROM POLITICAL CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS	18	N	MT	U	U	7
173	CIVIL RIGHTS (13)	PROTECTION FROM CENSORSHIP OF MAIL	18	N	MT	U	U	7
174	POLITICAL RIGHTS (1)	RIGHT TO ESTABLISH PEACEFUL POLITICAL OPPOSITION	18	N	MT	U	U	7
175	POLITICAL RIGHTS (2)	MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS, UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND SECRET BALLOTS	18	N	LT	U	U	7
177	RIGHTS OF MINORITIES	SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EQUALITY FOR ETHNIC MINORITIES	18	N	LT	U	U	7
178	RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION	INDEPENDANCE FOR EDITORS OF THE PRESS, RADIO	18	N	LT	U	U	7

NO	TITLE	DESCRIPTION	AREA	LEVEL	FREQUENCY	SEX GROUP	AGE GROUP	SOURCE
		NETWORKS AND INDEPENDANT TELEVISION						
179	INDEPENDANCE OF THE COURTS		18	N	LT	U	U	7
180	INDEPENDANCE OF UNIONS		18	N	LT	U	U	7
181	RIGHT TO NATIONALITY	LEGAL RIGHT TO A NATIONALITY	18	N	LT	U	U	7
182	PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE	PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE UNTIL GUILT IS PROVEN	18	N	LT	U	U	7
183	RIGHT TO LEGAL ASSISTANCE	FREE LEGAL AID WHEN NECESSARY AND FREE CHOICE OF COUNSEL	18	N	LT	U	U	7
184	RIGHT TO OPEN AND QUICK TRIAL		18	N	LT	U	U	7
185	PROTECTION FROM ABUSE BY THE POLICE	PROTECTION FROM SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT	18	N	LT	U	U	7
186	RIGHT TO PROPERTY	PROTECTION FROM ARBITRARY SEIZURE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY	18	N	LT	U	U	7
187	FREEDOM TO CHOOSE MARITAL PARTNER	INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM TO CIVIC MARRIAGE WITH PARTNER OF ANOTHER RACE OR RELIGION	18	N	LT	U	U	7
188	INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS (1)	EQUALITY OF THE SEXES DURING MARRIAGE AND IN THE PROCEDURES OF DIVORCE	18	N	LT	U	A3+	7
189	INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS (2)	HOMOSEXUALITY BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS	18	N	LT	U	A3+	7
190	FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE		18	N	LT	U	A3+	7